Conventional Arms Control

A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson (ed.), Robert Dalsjö,
Carolina Vendil Pallin and Mike Winnerstig

FOI-R--4586--SE

April 2018

FOI

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson (ed.), Robert Dalsjö, Carolina Vendil Pallin and Mike Winnerstig

Conventional Arms Control

A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?

Title	Conventional Arms Control – A Way Forward or Wishful Thinking?
Report no	FOI-R--4586--SE
Month	April
Year	2018
Pages	84
ISSN	1650-1942
Customer	UD/Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Forskningsområde	8. Säkerhetspolitik
Project no	B12515
Approved by	Lars Höstbeck
Ansvarig avdelning	Försvarsanalys

Cover: The OSCE works in conflict prevention and resolution, facilitating settlements of conflicts and promoting peacebuilding and post-conflict rehabilitation. (Copyright: OSCE/Evgeny Maloletka).

Sammanfattning

Finns förutsättningar för en ny rustningskontrollregim i ett europeiskt säkerhetspolitiskt klimat präglat av misstro och konfrontation? För att bidra med en samlad bild av läget analyserar denna studie de militärpolitiska intressena hos Ryssland, USA och valda europeiska stater avseende tre övergripande frågor: Vilka är de huvudsakliga säkerhetspolitiska målsättningarna för Ryssland, USA och europeiska stater? Vilka militärpolitiska överväganden bestämmer hur länderna söker främja dessa mål? Sammanfaller dessa intressen med ett förnyat fokus på rustningskontroll och militärt förtroendeskapande?

Studiens huvudsakliga slutsatser kan sammanfattas i följande punkter:

- Ryssland anser att den allomfattande säkerhetsordningen favoriserar euro-atlantiska organisationer. Ryssland verkar i stället för ett system baserat på stormakters privilegierade intressesfärer, vilket i praktiken betyder ett ryskt veto mot fortsatt Natoutvidgning.
- USA värnar rådande regelverk och överenskommelser och pekar på Rysslands aggressiva beteende som grundproblemet för säkerheten i Europa. Rustningskontroll är således enbart meningsfull som del av en regelbaserad säkerhetsordning.
- Det finns en underliggande spänning mellan diplomatiska intressen av dialog och förhandling och hårda militära säkerhetsintressen.
- En västlig linje betraktar de olösta territoriella konflikterna i Rysslands närområde som kärnproblemet i den europeiska säkerhetskrisen.
- En andra västlig utrikespolitisk linje ser avspänning som möjlig om diskussionerna kring rustningskontroll och militärt förtroendeskapande separeras från de olösta territoriella konflikterna.
- Östersjöregionen framträder i ett militärstrategiskt perspektiv som ett centralt område, en brännpunkt i konfrontationen mellan Ryssland och

Väst. Regionen har blivit en spelplan för de konkurrerande intressen som önskar se antingen upprustning eller rustningskontroll som svar på den ökande spänningen.

- Ryssland har två tydliga militärstrategiska prioriteringar i Östersjöregionen: begränsa Natos möjligheter att tillföra stridskrafter till regionen, samt säkra att icke-Natoländerna i regionen även fortsatt står utanför alliansen.
- För de tongivande västmakterna är Östersjöregionen viktig för Natos trovärdighet. 2016 års beslut om en förstärkt framskjuten närvaro (eFP) är ett sätt att återförsäkra utsatta medlemmar om den samlade alliansens stöd.
- De baltiska länderna och Polen, men även Finland, har som gemensamt intresse att säkerheten kring Östersjön förblir förankrad i en allmäneuropeisk säkerhetsordning.
- Intresset för förhandlingar om rustningskontroll är i rådande läge svalt bland de flesta stater. Så länge de två nyckelaktörerna – Ryssland och USA – ställer sig avvisande till diskussioner om rustningskontroll ter sig utsikterna för att nå ett genombrott små.

Incitamenten i dagens Europa skiljer sig från när existerande avtal förhandlades fram. Dagens juridiskt och politiskt bindande dokument är i fara, inte minst eftersom Ryssland uppfattar dem som ståendes i motsättning till ryska säkerhetsintressen.

Nyckelord: Rustningskontroll, förtroendeskapande åtgärder, CFE-avtalet, Open Skies, Wiendokumentet, Nato, Ryssland, europeisk säkerhet.

Summary

Undertaken at a time when European security is under stress, this study analyses the preconditions for a new conventional arms control regime. To this end, the military-political interests of Russia, the US and selected European countries are examined with regard to three principal questions: What are the major security policy goals for Russia, the US and European states? Which are the prevailing military-political considerations in these countries' pursuit of those goals? And how do the interests and policies of the respective states dovetail with a renewed focus on conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs)?

The main conclusions can be summarised as follows:

- Russia perceives the comprehensive and cooperative security order as rigged in favour of Euro-Atlantic organisations. It is actively seeking to establish an alternative order that would grant Moscow a sphere of privileged interests in its 'near abroad'. In practice, this implies a Russian veto on further NATO enlargement.
- The US wants to uphold existing rules and agreements, and identifies Russia's aggressive behaviour as the root cause of the European security problem. Arms control is, thus, only meaningful as long as it is embedded in a rules-based security order.
- There is an underlying tension between the diplomatic interest of dialogue and negotiation on the one hand and the hard military security interests of states on the other hand.
- One Western line of thought perceives the unresolved territorial conflicts in Russia's neighbourhood as the source of the current European security crisis.

- Another Western line believes that tensions between Russia and the West can be reduced if discussions on CAC and CSBMs are disentangled from the unresolved conflicts.
- The Baltic Sea region has emerged as a geopolitical focal point in the stand-off between Russia and the West. The region has become the subject of conflicting interests wishing to see either a military build-up or a special arms control regime as the way to address current security concerns.
- Russia has two military-strategic priorities in the Baltic Sea region: to constrain NATO deployment of additional military forces to the region, and to preclude the non-NATO members in the region joining NATO.
- For the major Western powers, the Baltic Sea region is crucial for the credibility of NATO.
- The Baltic countries and Poland, as well as non-NATO member Finland, share a common interest in ensuring that the security arrangements for the Baltic Sea region remain firmly attached to the overall European security order.
- At present, the prospects for negotiations on a new CAC regime are slim. No changes are to be expected as long as the two major players – Russia and the US – remain on the fringes of the dialogue.

The incentives in contemporary Europe are not the same as they were when existing agreements were negotiated and adopted. Today's legally and politically binding documents are in danger, not least because Russia perceives them as anathema to its national security interests.

Keywords: Arms control, confidence building measures, CFE Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, Vienna Document, Nato, Russia, European security.

Preface

Since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in eastern Ukraine a climate of political-military distrust has taken hold of Europe. Deterrence has returned. In response to the unstable and unpredictable security environment, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2016 proposed to re-launch a dialogue on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for the purpose of rebuilding trust and cooperation.

Against this background, this study analyses the prerequisites for creating new conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in a European security environment characterised by the return of geopolitics and confrontation. It is the result of an assignment from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The task was to study arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, including Russian, European, and American interests.

We are indebted to Johan Tunberger for his review of the draft report, to Keir Giles who provided useful comments on Chapter 3, and to Eve Johansson who language-edited and copyedited the text.

Gudrun Persson, deputy research director, editor

Stockholm, March 2018

Acronyms and abbreviations

A2/AD	anti-access/area denial
ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ACV	armoured combat vehicles
ATTU	Atlantic to the Urals
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CAC	conventional arms control
CFE Treaty	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSBMs	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
eFP	enhanced Forward Presence
EDI	European Deterrence Initiative
ERI	European Reassurance Initiative
EST	European Security Treaty
EU	European Union
GDP	gross domestic product

HFA	Helsinki Final Act
HNSA	Host Nation Support Agreements
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
JCG	Joint Consultative Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OS Treaty	Open Skies Treaty
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Paris Charter	Charter of Paris for a New Europe
PEP	Panel of Eminent Persons
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PMDA	Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement
SPD	Social Democratic Party (Germany)
TLE	treaty-limited equipment
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
Vienna Document	Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
WP	Warsaw Pact

Contents

1 Introduction

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson, Robert Dalsjö, Carolina Vendil Pallin and Mike Winnerstig

Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and military aggression in eastern Ukraine have put European security in peril. In the place of cooperative security, a new political-military climate filled with distrust has taken hold in Europe. Deterrence has returned with states focusing on rebuilding their conventional military capabilities and increasing spending on weapons, equipment, training and troops. In response to the unstable and unpredictable security environment, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2016 proposed to re-launch a dialogue on conventional arms control (CAC) and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for the purpose of rebuilding trust and cooperation.[1] Since neither NATO member states nor OSCE participating states had been consulted in advance, the proposal was rather cautiously received among the OSCE's 57 participating states. During the autumn of 2016, the proposal was channelled into a broader compromise – the Hamburg Declaration – in which the OSCE's participating states "committed to launching a structured dialogue on security and arms control".[2] Thus, the structured dialogue has emerged as a compromise in a situation where existing multilateral agreements are struggling to handle current security realities.[3] In an additional German-led initiative, several European states joined forces in establishing a group of like-minded states – a parallel dialogue format devoted to supporting the re-launch of CAC in Europe. In a joint declaration, the like-minded states highlighted "an urgent need

[1] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "More security for everyone in Europe: A call for a re-launch of arms control," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 August 2016, http://www.osce.org/cio/261146?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[2] The decision on launching a structured dialogue was taken at the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting held in Hamburg on 8 and 9 December 2016. See OSCE, "From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the twentieth anniversary of the OSCE framework for arms control," 9 December 2016, http://www.osce.org/cio/289496?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[3] *European Leadership Network*, "Making conventional arms control fit for the 21st century," 8 September 2017, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/making-conventional-arms-control-fit-for-the-21st-century_5080.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

to re-establish strategic stability, restraint, predictability and verifiable transparency and to reduce military risks".[4]

The task at hand is to address both long-term and short-term challenges. In a long-term perspective, the key challenge is to maintain a sustainable, robust and predictable European security order. The more immediate concerns relate to how to handle the escalating tensions between Russia and the West, manifested, for example, by growing distrust and militarisation in certain geographical flashpoint areas, including the Baltic Sea region.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the prerequisites for creating new CAC and CSBMs in a European security environment characterised by the return of geopolitics and confrontation. To this end, the bulk of the report is devoted to mapping and analysing the interests and policies of Russia, the US, the three major European powers – Germany, France and the UK – as well as five EU member states bordering Russia in the Baltic Sea region – Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland. Specifically, the study addresses the following principal questions. What are the major security policy goals for Russia, the US and European states? Which military-political considerations prevail in these countries' pursuit of those goals? And how do the interests and policies of the respective states dovetail with a renewed focus on CAC and CSBMs?

The examination of the countries is delimited to aspects that have bearing on European security in general and the potential role of CAC and CSBMs in particular. From a time perspective, the study emphasises the evolution of policies following the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014. That said, in order to paint a clear picture and focus on the states' main security priorities, the authors occasionally take a longer post-Cold War perspective.

The study is based on open sources, primarily official government documents and speeches. There are, however, variations among the national governments examined, both in degree of openness and in level of detail, in their discussions on European security, military priorities and CAC and CSBMs. Therefore, complementary information on aspects not directly, or only summarily, treated in official documents and speeches has been gathered from research reports, policy papers and media reporting.

The study starts out by providing a review of CAC and CSBMs in Europe against the backdrop of the Steinmeier proposal and the challenges confronting the OSCE's comprehensive and cooperative security order. The origins and basic tenets of the three principal instruments in the field of CAC and CSBMs – the

[4] "Ministerial declaration by the foreign ministers of the like-minded group supporting a relaunch of conventional arms control in Europe," Press release, 25 November 2016, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/Newsroom/161125-erkl-freundesgruppe-konv-ruestungskontrolle-europa/285610 (accessed 19 February 2018). Initially, the like-minded group consisted of 14 European countries. As of early 2018, the group had expanded to 22 states

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Open Skies (OS) Treaty and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe – are briefly described as well as the problems besetting each of them. The second and major part of the study consists of three chapters dealing with the security policy goals, military considerations and positions on CAC and CSBMs of Russia, the US and selected European states. The concluding chapter fleshes out the principal differences between and similarities among the states, and discusses the implications for CAC and CSBMs.

2 Anatomy of existing OSCE instruments

Johan Engvall

The current unpredictable security landscape of Europe contrasts with the post-Cold War vision of a united, peaceful Europe built around democratic states committed to specific cooperative principles enshrined in the major OSCE documents. Equally striking is the divergence from the late Cold War period, when existing CAC and CSBMs were negotiated, drafted, and signed. This chapter provides an overview of the Steinmeier proposal and some concrete suggestions that it spawned in the fields of CAC and CSBMs. It also traces the evolution of the OSCE's comprehensive and cooperative security order as the framework for ordering relations among its participating states. Against this backdrop, the chapter discusses the role of CAC and CSBMs in the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe, with a particular emphasis on dissecting the anatomy of these instruments.

2.1 The Steinmeier initiative

When Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, launched his proposal for reviving CAC in August 2016, it represented an attempt to reduce tensions and rebuild trust and cooperation between Russia and the West. Since then, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has actively tried to put forward several ideas in its bid to enhance the relevance of CAC and CSBMs for European security. Much of this work goes back to five key areas identified in Steinmeier's initial proposal: *regional limitations* in militarily sensitive regions such as the Baltic Sea region; *new military capabilities* and strategies; the integration of *new weapon systems*, such as UAVs; flexible and independent *verification mechanisms*; and applicability in *disputed territories*.[5] Of these five areas, re-tailoring CAC and CSBMs and designing special sub-regional measures for the Baltic Sea region have received the most attention from German policymakers and analysts, suggesting the need for closer examination of these ideas.

[5] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "More security for everyone in Europe: A call for a re-launch of arms control," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 August 2016, http://www.osce.org/cio/261146?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

Several German analysts have introduced the concept of so-called status-neutral security for areas troubled by unresolved conflicts. This notion was originally developed in the context of the Georgian breakaway territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but appears to be seen as applicable to the situation in Ukraine as well. Since agreements on CAC and CSBMs are non-functioning in these conflict regions, there is a high degree of uncertainty about the activities and capacities of military forces stationed in these territories. The argument is, therefore, that special CAC and CSBMs should be developed that are applicable to conflict regions, irrespective of their political status.[6] This position indicates that local conflicts cannot be allowed to impede general progress on CAC and CSBMs; in fact, according to this line of thinking, work on CAC and CSBMs should be isolated from unresolved conflicts and even "refrain from prejudging eventual political solutions".[7]

Another idea casts arms control as increasingly important for crisis management. This novelty, first raised in an edited volume based on a conference on CAC in Berlin in 2015, entails an applicability of CAC and CSBMs that expands beyond the traditional focus on military predictability, confidence-building and conflict prevention to encompass conflict management as well. This idea stems in part from the limited, but still continuing, inspections and monitoring flights conducted in the early phase of the war in Ukraine under the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty.[8] This is not just an academic exercise, for the 2016 White Paper on German Security Policy subsequently incorporated the idea of arms control as an increasingly important instrument of crisis management.[9]

There are also suggestions that conflict regions could be linked to the concept of third-party verification. The purpose of third-party verification mechanisms is to permit "effective verification that is rapidly deployable, flexible and independent in times of crisis (e.g. carried out by the OSCE)".[10] For example, a 2016 report from the Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP) on European Security as a Common Project – created by the OSCE to promote an inclusive and constructive security dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions – identifies an empowered "OSCE with a more authoritative and institutionalised neutral

[6] For a recent policy report on the theme produced by the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), see Sergi Kapanadze, Ulrich Kühn, Wolfgang Richter and Wolfgang Zellner, "Status-Neutral Security, Confidence-Building and Arms Control Measures in the Georgian Context," *CORE Working Paper 28*, Hamburg, January 2017.

[7] Wolfgang Richter, "Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of Conventional Arms Control," *Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 11*, September 2017, 13.

[8] Wolfgang Zellner (ed), *Conventional Arms Control in Europe: New Approaches in Challenging Times*, Hamburg: CORE Working Paper 26, September 2015.

[9] Germany, Federal Government, *White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 2016, 82.

[10] Steinmeier, "More security for everyone in Europe."

verification capacity as a way of building trust".[11] A concept note to the OSCE Security Days in October 2016 also noted approvingly the suggestion that "an institutionalised mechanism for military inspections under the OSCE Secretariat" be established.[12] This initiative suggests that there is currently a problem with verification, and that an impartial verification mechanism could improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of military inspections. If it is implemented, a supranational team of OSCE experts would thus take over military inspections from national inspectors. In this light, initiatives along the lines of establishing new types of impartial verification mechanisms, designed and implemented under the auspices of the OSCE rather than the participating states, would portend a controversial debate on supranational versus intergovernmental approaches to CAC and CSBMs in the OSCE.

Steinmeier's proposal devoted special attention to the need to "define regional ceilings, minimum distances, and transparency measures (especially in militarily sensitive regions such as the Baltic)".[13] Since then, several German analysts have argued explicitly for introducing limits on military capabilities in the Baltic Sea region.[14] Overall, the idea of sub-regional arms control in the Baltic Sea region has lacked conceptual clarity, leading some countries to fear that it essentially implies a regionalisation of security, i.e. that the region would be detached from the general European security framework. The positions of those countries directly affected by such measures – the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland – are detailed in chapter 5 which discusses European states. It suffices here to note that the idea of the Baltic Sea region as a testing ground for alleviating tensions between NATO and Russia would have far-reaching consequences for the countries in the region.

[11] OSCE, Panel of Eminent Persons, "Renewing Dialogue on European Security: A Way Forward. Report on outreach events of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project in 2016," 23 November 2016, http://www.osce.org/networks/291001?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[12] OSCE, Security Days, "Revitalising military confidence-building, risk reduction and arms control in Europe," 29 August 2016, http://www.osce.org/sg/261456?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[13] Steinmeier, "More security for everyone in Europe."

[14] See for example Volker Perthes and Oliver Meier, "A Baltic Test for European Arms Control," *Project Syndicate*, 15 February 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nato-russia-baltic-security-dialogue-by-volker-perthes-and-oliver-meier-2017-02?barrier=accessreg (accessed 19 February 2018); Wolfgang Richter, "Sub-regional arms control for the Baltics: What is desirable? What is feasible?" *Deep Cuts Working Paper*, No. 8, July 2016.

2.2 Comprehensive and cooperative security in the OSCE

In the historical process of building comprehensive and cooperative security for Europe, the first major codified step was the signing of the Helsinki Final Act (HFA) of 1975. This founding document, signed by 32 nations, represented the culmination of a decade of negotiations to contain the negative military and geopolitical tensions of the Cold War. It came into existence during a period of relative stability, when both the Eastern and the Western blocs had accepted the status quo. The general security environment was thus antagonistic, but with a lowest common denominator of avoiding the outbreak of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WP) and stabilising the status quo. While both sides acknowledged that profound differences remained, particularly in the political and military spheres, there were incentives for striking an agreement. In this grand bargain, the West acknowledged continued Soviet supremacy in the East in exchange for increased military and political transparency, as well as cooperation in commercial, cultural and scientific fields. Consequently the overall relationship was unbundled into three so-called "baskets": military and political; economic; and human rights. Since then the OSCE's broad and comprehensive approach to security has incorporated these three complementary and equally important dimensions.[15]

An intermediate step forward occurred during the Stockholm Conference of 1984–1986, when participating states in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) concluded negotiations on a set of CSBMs designed to promote openness about and predictability of military activities in Europe.[16] Again, the main purpose was to reduce the risk of armed conflict on the European continent.

In 1990, the second major step was taken with the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (Paris Charter) as well as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document 1990. Compared to the two previous documents – negotiated within the framework of an antagonistic division between East and West – the approach this time around was distinctly positive. The aim was to dismantle the Cold War confrontational line of thinking and establish a "Europe whole, free and at peace". After the end of the Cold War, the European security order has rested on the idea that: "Co-operation is beneficial to all participating states while the insecurity in or of one participating

[15] OSCE, "The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security: An Overview of Major Milestones," 17 June 2009, 1, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/37592?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[16] Document of the Stockholm Conference, 1986, 19 September 1986, http://www.osce.org/fsc/41238?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

state can affect the well-being of all."[17] Thus, cooperative security presumes that states would cooperate towards the common goal of security. In the OSCE context, the crux of the matter is that security is indivisible: "the security of each state of our region is inextricably linked with the security of every other state".[18]

More than 25 years later, the comprehensive and cooperative security order can no longer be taken for granted. Russia's activities in Georgia and Ukraine amount to a fundamental challenge to the *acquis* of European security. Instead of cooperative security, Russia sees its own privileged right to a sphere of interests that balances the West. In response to an increasingly unpredictable adversary, the West is returning to a focus on strengthening collective defence. While the OSCE responded to the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine by deploying a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the overall antagonistic environment raises the question of whether the role of the OSCE as a forum for building common security remains as obvious as it once was.[19] The attempt to re-launch negotiations on CAC and CSBMs could be interpreted as a step in reviving the OSCE's role in European security. Challenges abound. The core matter in dispute, however, is whether a dialogue on CAC and CSBMs, with an eye on future negotiations, can be detached from fundamental disagreements on how to organise relations between states.

2.3 CAC and CSBMs in Europe

Existing CAC and CSBM instruments originated as a response to the Cold War military balance between East and West at a time when Europe was possibly the most heavily militarised continent in the world. The massive concentration of forces during this period raised fears of the risk of military invasion and a general war in Central Europe. From a Western perspective, this was particularly worrisome in the light of the inferiority of NATO's conventional capabilities in comparison to those of the WP, especially on the ground. In the interconnected fields of CAC and CSBMs, three principal documents have been at the heart of the European security order over the past quarter of a century: the CFE Treaty, the OS Treaty and the Vienna Document. An examination of each of these instruments is therefore in order.

[17] OSCE, "The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security," 1.
[18] OSCE, "The Indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic Security," Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut. 18th Partnership for Peace Research Seminar, Vienna Diplomatic Academy, 4 February 2010, http://www.osce.org/sg/41452?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018). See also OSCE, *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, Paris 19-21 November 1990, 5, https://www.osce.org/mc/39516?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
[19] Stefan Lehne, "Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis," *Carnegie Europe*, September 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_249_Lehne_OSCE.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

2.3.1 CFE Treaty

Often referred to as the "cornerstone of European security", the CFE Treaty was negotiated during the final years of the Cold War, and was signed on 19 November 1990 by 22 countries included in the NATO and WP. Since both the WP and the Soviet Union broke up shortly afterwards, 30 countries ratified the treaty in 1992. The CFE Treaty regulates the possession and location of five categories of heavy military equipment, so-called treaty-limited equipment (TLE) – battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Geographically, the treaty covers a zone from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU). The basic principle behind the CFE Treaty was to limit the quantities and locations of weapons for the purpose of reducing the risk of surprise attacks and concentration of forces. The regime set equal ceilings for the two blocs and introduced geographical restrictions, including flank zone ceilings to avoid the concentration of troops along the borders of the two alliances.[20] Compliance was assured through a comprehensive set of intrusive verification measures emphasising on-site inspections. Taken together, the central pillars of reductions, information exchanges and verification made the CFE Treaty an integral part of shifting the European security environment away from insecurity and distrust to cooperation and confidence-building. The importance of the CFE Treaty in changing military security in Europe can hardly be overestimated. It radically reduced tensions and dismantled heavy military equipment. It also introduced a level of transparency that would have been unimaginable at the height of the Cold War. By 2013, the CFE Treaty had contributed to the elimination of more than 72,000 pieces of military equipment, more than 5,500 intrusive on-site inspections and detailed exchange of data.[21]

Following the break-up of the WP and the Soviet Union, it became clear that the treaty needed adjustment to the post-bloc political reality in Europe. A new Adapted CFE Treaty was subsequently negotiated and signed in Istanbul in 1999. The adapted treaty replaced the bloc ceilings with specific national and regional ceilings on military equipment, and raised expectations of the CFE Treaty turning into a true pan-European regime. Such hopes, however, failed to materialise as the agreement on adaptation never entered into force. Western states rejected ratification on the ground that Russia had failed to adhere to the

[20] James M. Acton, *Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, 42.

[21] Jacek Durkalec, "Rethinking Conventional Arms Control in Europe: A Transparency-Centred Approach," Strategic File No. 7, September 2013, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/169601/PISM%20Strategic%20File%20no%207%20(34).pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

so-called "Istanbul commitments" – politically binding pledges by Moscow to withdraw its forces and equipment from the territories of Moldova and Georgia.[22]

Meanwhile, Russia became ever more critical in its appraisal of the fit between the CFE regime and the political and strategic reality in Europe.[23] Issues drawing the ire of Moscow included NATO enlargement, the American plans for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems in Eastern Europe and the independence of Kosovo.[24] Russia has also insisted on the need to renegotiate treaty limitations in the flank zones, which it sees as undermining Russia's security close to its borders, especially in the south, but also along its northern flank. Those CFE state parties directly affected by the elimination of such restrictions – primarily Turkey, but also Norway – have rejected this demand. Russia further felt that the value of the CFE Treaty was severely circumscribed by the facts both that several European countries remain outside the treaty and that others, apart from Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, never ratified the Adapted CFE Treaty. In 2007, Russia unilaterally suspended its application of the CFE Treaty. Ever since, Moscow has refused to provide data and information, and has taken no part in the treaty's inspection regime. Moscow decided to suspend its participation despite the fact that there was no clause in the treaty that would allow this. As a countermeasure, NATO members ceased to implement certain CFE Treaty obligations vis-à-vis Russia. In 2015, Russia also decided to withdraw its participation from the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), the body in Vienna dealing with questions relating to compliance with the CFE Treaty, leaving its representation to Belarus while maintaining its veto as a state party.[25] Despite the unravelling of the CFE process, remaining state parties are implementing the obligations stipulated in the treaty as a sign of good faith.[26]

[22] Ulrich Kühn, "Conventional Arms Control 2.0," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 26, no. 2 (2013), 191.

[23] Zdzislaw Lachowski, "The CFE Treaty one year after its suspension: a forlorn treaty?" *SIPRI Policy Brief*, January 2009, 4, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRIPB0901.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

[24] Jeffrey D. McCausland, "The Future of the CFE Treaty – Why It Still Matters," *EastWest Institute*, 2009, 4, http://scholar.dickinson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1323&context=faculty_publications (accessed 19 February 2018).

[25] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Dogovor ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope (DOVSE). Kontrol' nad obychnymi vooruzheniyami v Evrope," 6 July 2017, http://www.mid.ru/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola-nad-vooruzeniami/-/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/1137833 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[26] U.S. Department of State, "2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," 14 April 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270330.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).

2.3.2 Open Skies Treaty

A group of 27 states created the OS Treaty – a decision to open their airspace to unarmed flights to collect data on military forces and activities on the territories of other signatories of the treaty – in March 1992. After a lengthy ratification process, partly due to an initial inclination in some Russian political and military circles to perceive the treaty as a potential tool of reconnaissance and espionage, the OS Treaty entered into force on 1 January 2002.[27] Shortly thereafter, eight additional states joined as parties, among them Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states. The geographical area of application of the OS Treaty extends beyond that of the CFE Treaty by incorporating North America and Siberia. The stated purpose of the OS Treaty is to employ "a regime to improve openness and transparency, to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements and to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and in other relevant international institutions".[28] The OS Treaty introduced unprecedented openness of territorial access, and facilitated cooperation, since countries can conduct joint overflights and are obliged to share information from the flights equally between observing nation and observed nation, thereby preventing the monopolisation of information.[29] According to calculations by the US State Department, as of mid-July 2017, 1,377 flights had been conducted under the agreement.[30]

For nearly a decade, implementation of the OS Treaty was generally not a problem. However, the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, subsequently leading to Russia formally recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, changed the situation. In 2010, Moscow began to deny observation flights over Russian territories adjacent to the two breakaway regions. After 2014, the US in particular has identified a number of compliance issues that affect the implementation of the treaty. In a 2017 public report, the US criticised Russia for expanding the restriction of areas where OS aircraft can conduct observations. Besides the Russian borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, limits also apply to some areas of south-west Russia, the Kaliningrad region and Moscow. In addition, the US has raised compliance concerns in relation to the alleged Russian habit of invoking the concept of force majeure (event beyond state

[27] For an account of the negotiation and implementation of the OS Treaty, see Ernst Britting and Hartwig Spitzer, "The Open Skies Treaty," in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds., *Verification Yearbook* 2002 (London: Vertic, 2002), 223–238.

[28] OSCE, *Treaty on Open Skies*, 1, http://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[29] Pál Dunay, Márton Krasznai, Hartwig Spitzer, Rafael Wiemker and William Wynne, *Open Skies. A Cooperative Approach to Military Transparency and Confidence Building*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2004, xiii.

[30] U.S. Department of State, "2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments."

control) in a manner deemed disingenuous in 2014 and 2015.[31] Russia has refuted the compliance concerns, labelling them "stereotyped allegations".[32] Over time, the relative value of the technical component of retrieving data from overflights has declined due to new technology enabling the collection of more sophisticated data from satellite photos. Despite recent struggles, the OS Treaty remains in place and fulfils a useful function primarily as a CSBM.[33]

2.3.3 Vienna Document

The Vienna Document on CSBMs was originally created in 1990, and since then it has been revised in several rounds (1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011). The document builds on the HFA first "basket" dealing with military relations as well as the CSBMs developed in the Document of the Stockholm Conference 1986. It is the essential OSCE document on CSBMs, and constitutes an integral part of the organisation's all-encompassing approach to security as first outlined in the HFA and subsequently confirmed in the Paris Charter and the Istanbul Charter for European Security. The overall spirit of the Vienna Document, as formulated in Paragraph 2, emphasises "the duty of the participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general".[34] Politically but not legally binding, the agreement's most significant contribution to European security lies in enhancing military transparency among the 57 OSCE member states. Its provisions include exchange of military information and details of defence policy and expenditure,[35] and enabling inspection and observation of certain military activities, including rules for notification of exercises and new deployments (at least 9,000 troops) and rules for observation of certain military activities (exceeding 13,000 troops).[36]

[31] U.S. Department of State, "2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments."
[32] Lee Ferran, "How the US Says Russia Is Cheating in the 'Open Skies', *Code and Dagger*, 16 August 2017, https://codeanddagger.com/news/2017/8/16/how-the-us-says-russia-is-cheating-in-the-open-skies (accessed 19 February 2018).
[33] U.S. Mission to the OSCE, "Open Skies Review Conference: Conventional Arms Control in Europe in a Changing European Security Environment," Closing remarks delivered by Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller to the Open Skies Treaty 3rd Review Conference, Vienna, 10 June, 2015, https://osce.usmission.gov/closing-statement-by-under-secretary-rose-gottemoeller/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
[34] OSCE, *Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures*, 30 November 2011, https://www.osce.org/fsc/86597?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).
[35] For an analysis of the Vienna Document's use of military expenditure data as a CSBM, see Bent-Göran Bergstrand, "Using Military Expenditure Data as a Confidence and Security Building Measure: The UN and OSCE Experience," Paper presented at the Third Nordic Military Symposium 12–13 November 2013, Oslo.
[36] OSCE, *Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures*.

Over the past decade, starting with the Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008, both the EU and the US have argued that Moscow has violated several basic OSCE security principles, including sovereignty, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-use of force, non-interference, military transparency, fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law and states' freedom of choice of security arrangements. Regarding the obligations specified in the Vienna Document, Russia continues to withhold information on its military forces located in the separatist regions of Georgia, as well as on units in Crimea. Its selective implementation of the provisions in the Vienna Document also includes non-reporting of three specific types of military equipment deployed in the zone covered by the document.[37] Another worrying trend is Russia's routine use of no-notice large-scale snap exercises close to its borders with other states; such snap exercises, without notification to the troops, are exempted from the Vienna Document's transparency requirements. Regarding planned large-scale exercises, according to NATO officials, Russia has declared every single military exercise since 1991 to be below the Vienna Document's numerical threshold of 13,000 troops, thus managing to avoid ever allowing inspections or observation of an exercise.[38] In order to reinvigorate the Vienna Document, the EU and the US initiated a concerted modernisation effort in 2016, which failed to materialise due to Russian opposition.[39] Russian representatives blame NATO countries for failing to adhere to existing CSBMs and insist that the proposal to upgrade the Vienna Document does not make sense as long as NATO increases its military deployments next to the Russian border. Moreover, a modernised Vienna Document would only be of value if accompanied by ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty, Russia says.[40]

Among researchers and practitioners there is usually a consensus that strong treaty regimes rest on three pillars: a consensus on the need to prohibit or limit certain types of weapons or military activities; a legally binding document signed by the parties concerned; and robust verification mechanisms. Thus, to summarise this chapter, Russia's suspension of the CFE Treaty, the growing

[37] These are the BRM-1K armoured combat vehicle (ACV), the Su-30SM multi-role fighter and the Ka-52 attack helicopter.

[38] Teri Schultz, "Nato voices skepticism over size of Russia's military exercise," *Deutsche Welle*, 14 September 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/nato-voices-skepticism-over-size-of-russias-zapad-military-exercise/a-39682346 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[39] European Union, "EU Statement on reissuing the Vienna Document 2011", OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, No. 834, Vienna, 9 November 2016, http://www.osce.org/fsc/281371?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018); U.S. Mission to the OSCE, "Reissuing the Vienna Document 2011," 17 November 2016, http://www.osce.org/fsc/282846?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[40] See for example Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Statement by Anton Mazur, Head of the Russian Delegation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control, at the session of the annual OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, Vienna, 29 June 2016," No 1272-05-07-2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2344591 (accessed 19 February 2018).

number of compliance concerns regarding the OS Treaty and the failure of the attempt to reissue the Vienna Document illustrate how all three instruments are undermined in at least one of those components. Against this background, the following chapters turn attention to how Russia and Western states view the role of CAC and CSBMs in addressing European security problems.

3 Russian interests

Carolina Vendil Pallin

In the early 1990s Russia nursed hopes that the OSCE would develop into a substitute for NATO. As it became clear that these aspirations were unrealistic, Russia became increasingly pessimistic about the OSCE as a forum for achieving its security interests. Although Russia remains a signatory to the documents that underpin the OSCE, it has increasingly sought to pursue a realist political-military agenda while resisting the normative framework of the OSCE.[41] That Russia was dissatisfied with the post-Cold War European security order and with the OSCE became clear with Vladimir Putin's speech in Munich in February 2007. He called for a rethinking of the "architecture of global security" and stated that: "People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries."[42] One of Russia's geostrategic goals in Europe was clearly to prevent further accessions to NATO.

Russia suspended its participation in the CFE in April the same year and in 2015 also suspended its participation in the Joint Consultative Group, claiming that it did not live up to "present realities",[43] most importantly the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Russia's proposal for a legally binding European Security Treaty in 2008 was channelled into the OSCE Corfu Process (a step-by-step dialogue on the future of European security) rather than being embraced by the EU member states.[44] Mounting Russian dissatisfaction with the OSCE thus perhaps explains

[41] Elena Kropatcheva, "The Evolution of Russia's OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23, no. 1 (2015), 6–24; Elena Kropatcheva, "Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A 'Forum' for Dialogue or a 'Battlefield' of Interests," *European Security* 21, no. 3 (2012), 370–94; Bobo Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, London: Chatham House, 2015, 74.

[42] Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," 10 February 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[43] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov's interview with Interfax, 11 March 2015, No. 424-11-03-2015, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/obycnye-vooruzenia/-/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/1090147 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[44] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Statement by Mr. Vladimir Voronkov, Director of the Department of Pan-European Co-Operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, at the Joint Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-Operation and the OSCE Permanent Council," OSCE, FSC-PC.DEL/28/09, 9 September 2015, http://www.osce.org/fsc/38654 (accessed 19 February 2018).

why Russia's initial reaction to the Steinmeier initiative was less than enthusiastic.[45]

In order to understand what Russia's position is likely to be in talks on CAC as well as its approach to CSBMs it is necessary, first, to examine Russia's general security policy goals; and, second, to take into account the military-strategic considerations that prevail in Moscow.

3.1 Russian security goals

According to Russia, the world order is no longer one where the US dominates the system. It has developed into a multipolar system where Russia is one of the poles, with its own geopolitical sphere of interest. Thus, when Russia talks about equality in international relations, it refers to equality among equals, among the poles of the international system, a "global oligarchy". It does not envisage an order where small states have a say equal to that of the leading powers.[46] Russia wants to gain recognition for having a sphere of interest in its near neighbourhood, including the final say in which security policy choices these countries are allowed to make.

In spite of its waning power, the US remains the most important point of reference for Russia – not least to shore up its own great-power status. It measures itself against the US and it treasures each high-level bilateral meeting as a way of demonstrating that Russia has regained its rightful position in the world. Moscow is moreover convinced that Washington in particular is pursuing a policy aimed at containing Russia and that Europe more or less follows the lead of the US.[47] Russia's concerns when it comes to any arms control talks thus begin and end with the country's relationship with the US and with NATO. This is also one of the reasons why Russia insists that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) should be accepted as a counterpart to NATO, since it would boost Russia's status.

[45] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v sviazi so statei Ministra inostrannykh del FRG F.-V. Shtainmaiera, opublikovannoi v gazete 'Frankfurter Allgemeine Zietung' 26 avgusta 2016 goda," No. 1533-05-09-2016, 5 September 2016, http://www.mid.ru/obycnye-vooruzenia/-/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/2422300 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[46] Lo. *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 180.

[47] Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, *Strategiia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 31 December 2016, §12, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document133/ (accessed 19 February 2018); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, 30 November 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (accessed 19 February 2018). See also Vladimir Putin's Valdai speech, "Zasedanie Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba 'Valdai'," 19 October 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882 (accessed 19 February 2018).

When Russia discusses security in Europe, it will often refer to the NATO-Russia Founding Act from 1997 and especially the paragraph that states that the alliance commits itself to carry out its collective defence without "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces", and accuses NATO of having violated this pledge. The caveat that the NATO commitment was made "in the current and foreseeable security environment" is usually not mentioned by Russia; nor is the final sentence, which states: "Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe."[48] Thus, in its 2016 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia points to the "military restraint obligations in the NATO-Russia Founding Act", but also expresses its dismay at NATO expansion as well as NATO's "growing military activity in regions neighbouring Russia".[49] A Russian study has, moreover, pointed to the need to define what constitutes "substantial combat forces" as a possible concrete measure to discuss in the OSCE framework. It went on to state that the current rotation of NATO forces comes in at over brigade strength (5,000), a ceiling for both sides proposed by Russia in 2008 for the forces allowed to be deployed along each other's (NATO-Russia) borders.[50] This would extend the NATO-Russia Founding Act pledge to rotating forces as well as permanent ones, while not addressing pertinent issues such as what would be "similar Russian constraint" or the geographical parameters of "along the borders" for NATO and Russia respectively.

Increasing Russian displeasure with the EU's growing influence in Russia's near neighbourhood as well was behind Russia's bid for the legally binding European Security Treaty (EST) in 2008. Among the main principles that Russia wanted enshrined were non-interference in countries' internal affairs and not allowing "military alliances to evolve to the detriment of the security of other parties to the Treaty".[51] Russia was signalling its discontent with the European security order as it had evolved after the end of the Cold War. The EST was a demand for the European security architecture to be revised to take Russia's interests into account in what it considered its exclusive sphere of interest. More specifically, Russia wanted a veto against NATO accession for additional countries in Russia's near neighbourhood.[52]

---

[48] NATO, *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, Paris, 27 May 1997, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).

[49] *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016)*, §70.

[50] Viktor I. Mizin, "Budushchee kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami v Evrope," in Alexei Arbatov and Natalia Bubnova (eds), *Bezopasnost i kontrol nad vooruzheniiami 2015–2016: Mezhdunarodnoe vzaimodeistvie v borbe s globalnymi ugrozami*, Moscow: IMEMO RAN; ROSSPEN, 2016, 137.

[51] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Statement by Sergei Lavrov. The Challenges of 'Hard Security' in the Euro-Atlantic Region. The Role of the OSCE in Establishing a Stable and Effective Security System," OSCE, PC.DEL/480/09, 23 June 2009, http://www.osce.org/cio/37721?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[52] Richard Sakwa, *Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 142.

On the heels of the war in Georgia in August 2008, then President Dmitrii Medvedev thus spoke of Russia's neighbouring states as regions where Moscow considered itself to have privileged interests.[53] Russia expected to have a say not only in which alliances these states would be allowed to enter into, but also in which economic and political international frameworks they adhered to – preferably without having to bear the costs of empire.[54] Therefore, any of these states signing a deep free trade agreement with the European Union increasingly became a red line. In Russia's view, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine signing association agreements with the EU diminished Russian influence and trade opportunities. Perhaps even more importantly, it undermined the possibilities of pushing these countries into Vladimir Putin's Eurasian Union, and in a longer-term perspective, Russia considered closer cooperation with the European Union as a step towards NATO accession.

There is little reason to expect Russia to change its position on Crimea or other so-called "frozen conflicts" such as those in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. The frozen conflicts offer useful leverage in the region and a forward military presence while at the same time making NATO accession unlikely. The political stand-off between Russia and the West on these conflicts will therefore be protracted.[55] It is furthermore important to understand that Russia's influence in its neighbouring countries constitutes an asset in domestic politics. Putin's statement that "Crimea shall unite Russia" still stands. It would be difficult, not to say impossible, for Russia's political leadership to back down from its policy on the near neighbourhood in general and Crimea in particular without undermining its political legitimacy at home.[56]

The need to build military strength has come to dominate over other policy areas in Russia in recent years, and not only in budget terms. When it comes to decision making on arms control the centre of gravity is most likely not the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Rather, arms control issues are coordinated and hammered out between ministries and government agencies in the Security Council, where the Ministry of Defence, including the General Staff, has the

[53] Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, "Interviu Dmitriia Medvedeva rossiiskim telekanalam," 31 December 2008, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1276 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[54] Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 102ff.

[55] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Zaiavlenie rukovoditelia Delegatsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoi bezopasnosti i kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami A. Iu. Mazura na plenarnom zasedanii Sovmestnoi konstultativnoi gruppy po Dogovoru ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope," No. 414-10-03-2015, 10 March 2015, http://www.mid.ru/obycnye-vooruzenia/-/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/1089925 (accessed 19 February 2018). See also Russia's official position on these conflicts in the *Foreign Policy Concept 2016*, §§56–59.

[56] Jakob Hedenskog, Gudrun Persson and Carolina Vendil Pallin, "Russian Security Policy," in Gudrun Persson (ed.), *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016*, Swedish Defence Research Agency 2016, FOI-R--4326--SE, 97–132.

final say partly by virtue of its expertise in the area. It is unlikely that other agendas, such as the need to reduce international tensions, would be allowed to overshadow the military one in the near future.

Russia and the West are unlikely to find agreement on what constitutes comprehensive security or to converge on what the OSCE's normative agenda should be. Russia would like to see less emphasis on the human rights dimension of security enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. To Russia, democracy promotion is another way to undermine Russia's political system, an undue interference in Russia's internal affairs. Russian official texts and statements highlight the need to prevent democratic revolutions (so-called colour revolutions) and the establishment of regimes hostile to Russia in its neighbourhood.[57] Democratic revolutions are even framed as an integral part of contemporary warfare.[58]

Another area of domestic politics and debates that can have international repercussions is the growing emphasis on sovereignty, and more specifically Russia's sovereignty vis-à-vis international treaties that it has ratified. In July 2015, Russia's Constitutional Court ruled that it considered the Russian Constitution "hierarchically superior" to the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.[59] Article 15 in the Russian Constitution upholds the supremacy of international law and so far it is only the interrelationship between Russia's constitution and rulings in Strasbourg that has been challenged. However, high-ranking Russian officials have also suggested that the principle of supremacy of international law should be reconsidered or modified more generally.[60]

3.2 Russian military-strategic considerations

Russia's approach to the Steinmeier initiative is very much one of sitting back to wait and see how Germany's allies react to it – the very same allies "whose

[57] See, for example, paragraph 43 in the 2015 National Security Strategy, *Strategiia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 31 December 2015, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/4039 (accessed 19 February 2018). See also Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Spheres of Interests, not Influence," *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2009), 12.

[58] Gudrun Persson, "The War of the Future: A Conceptual Framework and Practical Conclusions Essays on Strategic Thought," *Russian Studies*, no. 3, NATO Defense College, 2017, 6ff, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1078 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[59] Lauri Mälksoo, "Russia's Consitutional Court Defies the European Court of Human Rights – Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Judgement of 14 July 2015, No. 21-П/2015," *European Constitutional Law Review*, no. 12 (2016), 386. See also Alexander Filippov, "National Interest and International Law," *Russia in Global Affairs*, no. 2 (2015), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/National-Interest-and-International-Law--17548 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[60] Mälksoo, "Russia's Constitutional Court Defies the European Court of Human Rights"; Filippov, "National Interest and International Law."

efforts brought the dialogue on conventional arms control to a standstill and froze it" according to Russia.[61]

The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia "strictly abides by its international arms control obligations" and that it "participates, on the basis of the principles of equal rights and indivisible security, in devising new arms control agreements that serve Russia's national interests and contribute to strategic stability".[62] The emphasis is on nuclear arms control, but there is one paragraph devoted specifically to CAC in Europe and it reiterates Russia's condition that "present realties" must be taken into account:

> In the context of efforts to strengthen regional stability in Europe, the Russian Federation seeks to bring the conventional arms control regime in Europe in line with present realities, as well as ensure unconditional compliance by all States with the agreed confidence and security-building measures.[63]

When it comes to both CAC and CSBMs, Russia repeatedly states that present realities should be taken into account – referring not least to the fact that the CFE Treaty was agreed upon before the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (WP). Since then, Russia argues, former members of the WP have joined NATO, thereby radically changing Russia's military-strategic position. In addition, the reference to "present realities" has become Russian shorthand for arguing against further accessions to NATO as well as against additional NATO military reinforcements on the territory of the alliance members in Russia's immediate neighbourhood.

While Russia would like to see restrictions on future alliance reinforcements, it has not proved willing to discuss similar limitations for Russian forces on its own national territory. Writing in 2018, Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, noted that "the Kremlin still regards NATO deployments close to the Russian border as nonthreatening", but also that geopolitical realities had to be accepted and "serious military buildups" avoided. In addition, he highlighted that Russia will not "accept limitations on its forces deployed on the national territory".[64] This draws attention to one of the basic realities that any future CAC agreement would have to take into account and spell out, namely who the antagonists are, who are the parties to a future treaty. In the CFE Treaty, there were two blocs. This is no longer the case, and certainly from a Russian perspective the antagonist is NATO – an alliance. A treaty that would allow Russia to move its forces on Russian territory but restrict movement of forces

[61] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii…"
[62] *Foreign Policy Concept (2016)*, §27:a, d.
[63] *Foreign Policy Concept (2016)*, §30. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii…"
[64] Dmitri Trenin, "Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation During the Hybrid War," *U.S.-Russia Insight*, Moscow: Carnegie, January 2018, 5–7, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Trenin_Hybrid_War_web.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

between NATO member states would be beneficial to Russia and limit NATO's range of manoeuvre considerably. Indeed, it would undermine the very idea of a military alliance. Likewise, a treaty or even a gentlemen's agreement not to allow additional military build-ups would cement the present asymmetrical advantage that Russia has vis-à-vis individual European countries along its borders.

Russia is convinced that a strong military is key to its national security. Since 2008, when it launched a military reform, it has increased its military capability considerably. It more than doubled its military spending between 2005 and 2015 and allowed its military burden to increase, reaching 5.4 per cent in terms of military spending as a share of GDP in 2015.[65] The increase in military spending was primarily geared towards modernising weapons and equipment, something that has resulted in an overall increase in Russian military capability. Russia has thus reached a position where it can use its military instrument to attain political goals and it has proved itself ready to do so in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014.

Russia's military exercises tell us that Russia is preparing for a large conventional war and for a war that could involve all of society. Russian military exercises have grown in size and become more complex. In addition, the frequent exercises and not least the large readiness exercises (often referred to as snap exercises) have created a new "normal" – including in the Baltic Sea region. The effect is that neighbouring states will have reduced warning time to prepare for a possible military conflict.

All in all, Russia has strengthened its military position in Europe. It has developed a military instrument that can be used for coercion without going into battle through its superiority in numbers compared to any individual state in its immediate neighbourhood. This is an asymmetry that Russia can exploit.[66]

Another asymmetry that Russia can exploit is what is usually referred to as "hybrid warfare" in Western analyses. There is a wealth of terms for this approach, as well as interpretations of what it encompasses. It typically refers to an operational strategy that incorporates different elements of warfare – military and non-military, special operations as well as nuclear rhetoric – in order to reach the political goal at hand.[67]

[65] Susanne Oxenstierna, "Russian Military Expenditure," in Gudrun Persson (ed.), *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016, FOI-R--4326--SE, 133–150.

[66] Fredrik Westerlund and Johan Norberg, "The Fighting Power of Russia's Armed Forces in 2016," in Gudrun Persson (ed.), *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016*, Swedish Defence Research Agency 2016, FOI-R--4326--SE, 67–96.

[67] Tatiana Anichkina, Anna Péczeli and Nickolas Roth, "The Future of US-Russian Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 73, no. 4 (2017), 272.

Russia is well aware that a full-scale open military confrontation with NATO would have disastrous consequences. It would therefore probably be careful not to use its military instrument to coerce at a level that makes it obvious that Article 5 should be invoked within NATO. It could do so, for example, by using tools that are more ambiguous than a clear-cut military invasion or by establishing a new reality on the ground before NATO has been given the necessary time to react. It could also test the willingness of the members of the alliance to rally to the military defence of a small country on its geographical outskirts.

The Russian grievances during the failed process to establish an adapted CFE Treaty as well as official statements and security documents provide valuable insights into what elements Russia would like to see included in a CAC treaty and what constitutes "present realities" in its view.[68] From a geostrategic perspective, Russia wants to prevent further NATO enlargement or the Alliance strengthening its position where it is already established. Russia's Military Doctrine lists a number of "military dangers", most importantly that "military infrastructure of the NATO member states" is coming ever closer to Russia's borders.[69] In other words, CAC in Russia's view would ideally be linked to it having a veto on NATO enlargement, especially in its immediate neighbourhood, and an embargo on additional US military bases, including US missile defence (BMD). This is probably included in the reference to "military infrastructure". Achieving this would be de facto proof of Russia's great-power role internationally – something that in turn would also be hard currency in regime survival domestically.

From a military-technological perspective, Russia has concerns when it comes to US capabilities in the sphere of long-range high-precision conventional weapons. Russia argues that these conventional weapons could come to undermine strategic stability as Moscow defines it[70] and has repeatedly voiced objections to the US development of BMD as well as the Prompt Global Strike concept and deployment of strategic conventional high-precision systems, all of which are

[68] Anatolii Antonov and Rodion Aiumov, "Kontrol nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope – konets rezhima ili istoriia s prodolzheniem?" *Nauchnye zapiski Pir-tsentra*, no. 1 (2012), Moscow: Pir Center, 37–45.

[69] *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, §12. *Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 25 December 2014. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

[70] Persson, "The War of the Future," 9–10. On the link between high-precision weapon systems and nuclear strategic arms, see also Anichkina, Péczeli and Roth, "The Future of US-Russian Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control," 275.

designated main military dangers in Russia's Military Doctrine.[71] The Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia is in favour of "constructive cooperation with the US in arms control", but also underlines that further strategic reductions "are only possible when taking into account all factors affecting global strategic stability" including BMD.[72] At times Russia also points to other capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and cyber warfare, and would also like to include naval capabilities in CAC.[73]

Russia has established a strategic forward position through its bilateral military collaboration with Belarus. This is also Russia's only access by land to the increasingly militarised Kaliningrad region, and even then only through a strictly regulated approach over Lithuanian territory. To Russia, Kaliningrad is both a military-strategic asset in the Baltic Sea region and a liability.[74] Russia has concentrated considerable capabilities for stand-off warfare in the region, but the exclave could prove difficult to defend in a military conflict.

Russia does not, as a rule, talk of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), but its military analysts are well aware of the existence of this Western concept.[75] Building up a considerable ability to dispute access to the sea and air space in the Baltic Sea and other strategic regions was a clearly stated goal when the Chief of the General Staff, Valerii Gerasimov, spoke at an open collegium at the Ministry of Defence in November 2017. According to Gerasimov, high-precision weapons, such as ships with Kalibr cruise missiles and Bastion coastal missiles as well as the S-400 air defence system, would be key to strengthening Russia in strategically important regions such as the Baltic Sea, the Barents Sea, the Black

[71] *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, §12. Russia claims to have developed air defence systems that can intercept hypersonic missiles (e.g. the S-500), but the consistent and strongly voiced protests against US missile defence nevertheless suggest that this remains a main concern for Russia. See, for example, *RIA Novosti*, "Voennyi ekspert rasskazal, chem RF otvetit na narashchivanie sistemy PRO SShA," 13 October 2017, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171013/1506749723.html (accessed 19 February 2018); *RIA Novost*i, "Voennyi ekspert rasskazal o sposobe zashchity ot globalnogo udara SShA," 13 October 2017, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171013/1506774540.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

[72] *Foreign Policy Concept (2016)*, §73.

[73] Albert Zulkharneev and Evgenii Buzhinskii, "Kontrol nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope ne dolzhen uviazyvatsia s politicheskimi voprosami," *Nasha Gazeta*, 17 March 2014, http://nashagazeta.ch/print/17336 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[74] Fredrik Westerlund, "Russia's Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad," *RUFS Briefing*, no. 40, FOI Memo 6060, May 2017, https://www.foi.se/download/18.bc6b81b15be852194d71d/1494413062692/RUFS%20Briefing%20No%2040%20Kaliningrad%20by%20Fredrik%20Westerlund.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

[75] Mizin, "Budushchee kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami v Evrope," 129.

Sea and the Mediterranean.[76] To this should be added not only the deployment of Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, but also increased capabilities for electronic warfare.

In addition to the concerns present in the Military Doctrine, the importance that Russia attaches to this was further emphasised in Putin's annual address to Parliament in March 2018, when the development of Russian weapons to counter Western technologically advanced systems constituted a key message.[77]

Russia will remain sensitive to NATO strengthening its military force posture in northern Poland (especially if it takes the form of US reinforcements), in the Baltic Sea region as a whole, or in, for example, Romania in the Black Sea region.[78] Efforts to block an increased US presence and an overall NATO military build-up as well would therefore ideally be part of a treaty on CAC from a Russian perspective as well as guarantees that non-aligned states in Europe are blocked from acceding to NATO. Consequently, Russian specialists have put forward the idea of "additional [CAC] measures in sub-regions",[79] something that could give Russia the advantage of arguing for specific ceilings to prevent NATO from deploying additional forces to the Baltic Sea region, for example, if political tensions quickly increased.

It is difficult to discern a coherent Russian agenda on CSBMs. Dangerous incidents that could escalate into a military conflict between NATO and Russia are not in Moscow's interest. Viktor Mizin from the Russian Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) has pointed to such risks as especially potent in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and suggested using some of the practices agreed upon along the contact line in Syria for these regions as well.[80] On an official level, the demand that CSBMs must reflect "present realities" is again a frequent theme. This applies also to the Vienna Document, which according to a former head of the Department for International Cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Evgenii Buzhinski, should

[76] Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, "Vystuplenie nachalnika Generalnogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii – pervogo zamestitelia oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii generala armii Valeriia Gerasimova na otkrytoi zasedanii Kollegii Minoborony Rossii 7 noiabria 2017 g.", https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12149743@egNews&_print=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[77] Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, "Poslanie Prezidenta Federalnomu Sobraniiu," 1 March 2018, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed 7 March 2018).

[78] Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, "NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge," *Survival* 58, no. 2 (2016), 95–116.

[79] PIR Center, "Perspektivy kontrolia nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope," 5 May 2017, http://pircenter.org/news/6914-perspektivy-kontrolya-nad-obychnymi-vooruzheniyami-v-evrope (accessed 19 February 2018).

[80] Mizin, "Budushchee kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami v Evrope," 129, 139.

undergo "thorough modification" and include naval forces.[81] Russia has also been active in pushing for CSBM measures on cyber security in a different track inside the OSCE.[82] It is also worth noting that in Dmitri Trenin's analysis in January 2018, Russia "can benefit from allowing some of its actions to be ambiguous or unpredictable".[83]

Political disagreements haunt talks on CSBMs as well. At the Moscow Conference on International Security in 2016, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated that the proposal from the West to modernise CSBMs and increase transparency looked "strange" given that NATO was talking about the need to contain Russia. As a necessary condition for talks on CSBMs to be productive he said that the West must stop its "anti-Russian course".[84] The statement underlines how technical matters quickly become political in the current atmosphere of distrust that dominates Russian-Western relations.

[81] Zulkharneev and Buzhinskii, "Kontrol nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope ne dolzhen uviazyvatsia s politicheskimi voprosami". On the need for a modernisation of the Vienna Document that takes "present realities" into account, see Mizin, "Budushchee kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami v Evrope," 139.

[82] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Vystuplenie Zamestitelia Sekretaria Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii O. V. Khramova na mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii OBSE po kiberbezopasnosti, g. Vena, 3 noiabria 2017 goda," 3 November 2017, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/rso/osce/-/asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/2938933 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[83] Trenin, "Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation", 5.

[84] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Vystuplenie Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S. V Lavrova na V Moskovskoi konferentsii po mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti, Moskva, 27 aprelia 2016 goda," 27 April 2016, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2256120/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_viewMode=print&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_qrIndex=1 (accessed 19 February 2018).

4 US interests

Mike Winnerstig

The United States and the Soviet Union dominated the European security sphere for the entire Cold War period. For the United States, the Cold War endgame in the late 1980s did not change this, as the US emerged as the only superpower and thus became the major architect of post-Cold War-era security in Europe. The US became a leading actor in all the peace and arms control treaties of the early 1990s, such as the 1990 CFE Treaty, that were the fruits of the end of the Cold War. One aspect of this was the revamping of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe into the OSCE in 1995.

In parallel, the fate of Russia, the successor state of the Soviet Union, became a US priority. Indeed, the US spent considerable energy on the so-called "Russia First" policy of the administration of Bill Clinton (1993-2000), which aimed at fostering a sense of friendship and partnership between the US and Russia.[85] Even today, the Russian-US relationship is a major, and probably the most important, dynamic in the field of European security. However, with the decision to accept the applications for NATO membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1997, political-military relations between the Western allies – including the US – and Russia started to deteriorate, as the Russian establishment was firmly against NATO enlargement.

With the event of the George W. Bush administration in 2001, attempts were made by both sides to improve the US-Russian relationship. After the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September that year, President Vladimir Putin expressed strong support for the US and its actions against international terrorism. That also changed, however, after the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, as well as the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the second major round of NATO enlargement in 2004. The latter entailed NATO membership not only for former Warsaw Pact members but also for former Soviet republics like the Baltic states, thus finally bringing them into the Western fold which they had coveted for long. With the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the US relations with Moscow got even worse.

However, the administration of Barack Obama (2009-2017) decided early on that better relations with Russia were a major priority. Thus, the so-called "reset

[85] This section is based on the discussion of the Russian-US relationship in Märta Carlsson and Mike Winnerstig, *Irreconcilable Differences: Analysing the Deteriorating Russian-US Relations*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016, FOI-R--427--SE.

policy" with Russia was introduced in 2009, as was a number of changes to other policies related to issues contested by Russian policymakers – such as the US missile defence plans for Europe. This did not, however, help the overall US-Russian relationship much, and after the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 the Obama administration enforced sanctions on Russia – in tandem with its European allies – and thus led the bilateral relationship to even lower levels.

After having won the US presidential elections in 2016, Donald Trump set out on a course explicitly directed at trying to make US-Russian relations better – in ways not entirely dissimilar to the early Obama policies. This was also linked to some election campaign statements by candidate Trump that were very dismissive of NATO and the transatlantic relationship as a whole. All this caused major concerns in Western Europe and rather high levels of optimism in the Kremlin. In practice, however, the Trump administration policies related to Europe, NATO and – in part – Russia have essentially been outsourced to the secretaries of state and defence (at the time Rex Tillerson and James Mattis, respectively) and to the White House National Security Council staff. These actors seem to have a far more traditional view of the US role in European security than the President. This entails clear support for NATO as an indispensable alliance, because of the shared values between Europe and the North American allies, and a very critical view of Russia.[86]

This means that at least so far into the Trump administration, the current US policies toward Europe are remarkably similar to the earlier administrations' policies. The US is essentially a status quo power in Europe, guarding the post-Cold War security order and providing the means of protecting it, through NATO and through an increasing American military posture on the continent.[87] This has meant that US-Russian relations so far, especially in the European and NATO settings, have stayed fairly bad. This has not, however, affected issues of strategic arms control such as the implementation of the New START Treaty of 2011. In conventional arms control, most aspects have been highly problematic for years. This is not only due to state of the US-Russian relationship, but that relationship plays a major role in it.

4.1 US security priorities for Europe

In the structured dialogue, the United States mission to the OSCE has repeatedly communicated that there is nothing wrong with the *acquis* of the European

[86] See Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, "The U.S. and Europe: Strengthening Western Alliances," remarks at the Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 28 November 2017, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/11/276002.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).

[87] See Fredrik Lindvall and Mike Winnerstig, *Väpnad solidaritet: USA:s militära närvaro i Europa fram till 2020*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2017, FOI-R--4428--SE.

security order per se. According to the US, the most prominent principles of European security – refraining from the threat or use of force, the territorial integrity of states, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples – constitute what could be characterised as inviolable principles, or the essence of the entire order. The problem is rather that one particular state – Russia – is violating these principles. The following statement from a US representative at the meeting in the structured dialogue in September 2017 exemplifies the position:

> The instability, uncertainty, and mistrust we see in Europe today is a direct result of the assault on these core principles, principally by one participating State. Some say that Europe's security architecture is no longer valid; it's outdated; it's not relevant to the 21st century. We disagree. There is nothing wrong with European security structures and little lacking in the OSCE's principles and its acquis. The problem stems from the actions of a select few that have disregarded these principles and enabled the resulting conflicts. We need to hold those who undermine the OSCE's principles accountable, not seek to rewrite the core acquis of this Organization and the European security order.[88]

On the road ahead, the US believes that it is crucial that the dialogue on current and feature security threats should be open-ended, without preconditions, preconceived conclusions or agendas driven by others than the participating states.[89] This could be interpreted as a firm US view on the structured dialogue as an inter-state format. Possible attempts to take the process in a supranational direction, under the auspices of for example the OSCE Secretariat, should therefore be avoided.

The emphatic US endorsement of the comprehensive and cooperative European security order means that the issues at stake go far beyond what can be addressed by means of a new CAC or additional CSBMs. At a time when the basic underlying principles of the European security order are threatened to the core, CAC and CSBMs cannot be pursued in isolation from these broader security ramifications. Putting it bluntly, arms control cannot deliver "respect for the territorial integrity of neighbours; observance of the commitment not to use force to resolve differences; or recognition that states have the right to choose their futures and their alliances, and indeed whether to allow foreign forces on their

[88] U.S. Mission to the OSCE, "U.S. Statement at Reinforced Meeting of the IWG on Structured Dialogue. As delivered by Jorgan Andrews, Office of Eastern European Affairs," 5 September 2017, https://osce.usmission.gov/u-s-statement-reinforced-meeting-of-the-informal-working-group-on-structured-dialogue/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

[89] U.S. Mission to the OSCE, "Developments of the Structured Dialogue. Remarks by Chargé d'Affaires, a.i. Kate M. Byrnes to the Joint Meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council," Vienna, 5 July 2017, https://osce.usmission.gov/structured_dialogue_development/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

territory".[90] In short, CAC and CSBMs only fulfil a function in the context of a rules-based order, in which key actors respect the basic rules of interaction.

Allowing CAC and CSBMs to take centre stage in the discussions would risk diverting the dialogue from the major threat perceptions confronting European security, according to US representatives. Such a scenario would also risk duplicating or undermining work on these concrete issues already taking place in the respective treaty implementation bodies. For example, modernising the Vienna Document is a long-standing ambition of the US. To this end, the US envisages a focused discussion in the Forum for Security Cooperation.[91] As of today, the most pressing problem in the field of CAC and CSBMs relates to the sincerity of implementation. The US argues that Russia systematically implements the treaties in a flexible manner that violates their intent. The US message to the other OSCE participating states is clear: "It is not credible that an exercise touted in the press as involving tens of thousands of troops was conducted without prior notice to the troops involved. It is not credible that activities involving complex military forces in the same time frame and the same geographic space are not under a single operational command."[92]

The perceptions communicated above naturally lead us into the issue of frozen conflicts in Europe. The US laments Russia's failure to fulfil its commitments made at the 1999 Istanbul summit to withdraw its military forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russia's actions are in direct violation of the legal obligations of the CFE Treaty, stipulating that there must be host state consent for the stationing of foreign military forces. Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine further add to the list of instances of Russia's lack of respect for the sovereignty, integrity and freedom of choice of neighbouring states. In this light "a new arms control negotiation will not help solve hardest security issues we face in Europe today, notably in Ukraine. Rather, we need the political will to insist that violations of basic principles – like military attack on a neighbour – have consequences for the perpetrator".[93] In sum, the US emphasises the intimate connection between the general security order and specific military questions related to CAC and CSDMs. From this point of view, concerns in the arms control field can not be treated as technical matters, for they must be pursued in tandem with a frank discussion on violations of the rules-based security order.

[90] U.S. Mission to the OSCE, "U.S. Remarks for 3rd IWG Structured Dialogue meeting. Session II: Arms control arrangements under the aegis of the OSCE: Is there a better way to handle compliance?" As delivered by Chargé d'Affaires, A.I. Harry Kamian, 5 September 2017, https://osce.usmission.gov/u-s-remarks-3rd-iwg-structured-dialogue-meeting/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

[91] U.S. Mission to the OSCE, "U.S. Remarks for 3rd IWG Structured Dialogue meeting…"

[92] U.S. Mission to the OSCE, "U.S. Remarks for 3rd IWG Structured Dialogue meeting…"

[93] U.S. Mission to the OSCE, "U.S. Statement at Reinforced Meeting of the IWG on Structured Dialogue…"

4.2 US military interests in Europe

Russia's aggression against Ukraine led the US administration to reverse the trend of a declining US military presence in Europe. In June 2014 President Obama launched the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) in order to assure the European NATO allies of the US's continued commitment to the continent's security. The budget of the ERI has steadily expanded from $789 million in 2016 to $3.4 billion for fiscal year 2017. The Trump administration's budget proposal for fiscal year 2018 envisaged an increase of 40 per cent, which brought funding close to $4.8 billion.[94] In 2017, the Trump administration shifted the name to European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). In 2018, the Trump administration's budget request for the EDI for fiscal year 2019 went up again, to a total sum of $6.5 billion. This does not entail funding for additional basing of US troops, but does include funding for an increase in the pre-positioned sets of heavy army equipment – including new main battle tanks – on the European continent.[95]

Since its inception, the EDI initiative has funded Operation Atlantic Resolve, a practical demonstration of the US commitment to collective defence. The operation includes: increased rotational presence of military units from the US in Europe; increased bilateral and multilateral exercises with the US and its European allies and partners; improved military infrastructure in Europe; enhanced pre-positioning of US equipment across Europe; and intensified US efforts to build partner capacity regarding interoperability and cooperation.[96] The multinational training and security cooperation led by the US military are taking place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.[97] Atlantic Resolve means a significantly enhanced American military capability in Europe, particularly on the ground.

The US commitment to Europe was further underlined with the decision at the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016 to establish a stronger allied military presence in Eastern Europe, the so-called Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The purpose of NATO's eFP in Eastern Europe, its biggest collective defence reinforcement in a generation, "is to protect and reassure NATO's Eastern member states of their security". It is thus a deterrence posture with the intent of signalling the

[94] The funds for fiscal year 2018 represented an increase of 40% over the previous fiscal year's budget of US$3.42 billion. See Department of Defense, "European Reassurance Initiative." Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2018, May 2017, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_ERI_J-Book.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

[95] See Jen Judson, "Funding to deter Russia reaches $6.5B in FY19 defense budget request," *Defense News*, 12 February 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/12/funding-to-deter-russia-reaches-65b-in-fy19-defense-budget-request/ (accessed 8 March 2018).

[96] U.S. EUCOM, "European Reassurance Initiative Fact Sheet," 5 January 2017.

[97] U.S. Army Europe, "What is Atlantic Resolve?" The Official Homepage of the United States Army Europe, http://www.eur.army.mil/AtlanticResolve/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

strength of the transatlantic link as well as deterring future Russian aggression in the region, including incursions into Ukraine.[98] The US Army leads the Battle Group Poland, stationed in Orzysz in north-east Poland. The Battle Group consists of more than 1200 soldiers, primarily from the US Army Europe's 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany. The Battle Group arrived in Poland in April 2017 and two months later participated in the US-led military exercise Saber Strike in the Baltic countries and Poland.[99]

In this context, the concept of "substantial combat forces", introduced in 1997, should be mentioned (see also 3.1 above for a discussion of the Russian interpretation of this concept).[100] In March 1997, the North Atlantic Council made a unilateral pledge against additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. In a more developed form, this was included in the NATO-Russia Founding Act a few months later. This was a way of mitigating Russian reactions against the decision to enlarge NATO with former WP countries – Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland – that the alliance was planning to take at the NATO Madrid summit in July 1997. However, the concept of "substantial combat forces" was never quantified, nor explicitly related to the new members of NATO only. In the context of the history of the negotiations of the Adapted CFE Treaty, some analysts have concluded that the permanent stationing of a brigade – some 5,000 troops – in any NATO country would not exceed the informal understanding of what constitutes "substantial combat forces". If this interpretation is correct, the current troop deployment of roughly 1,200 troops in each of the Baltic countries, on what is in fact a rotational rather than a permanent basis, is way below that limit.

In sum, despite early fears of US interest in NATO and Europe waning under President Trump, the administration's line, thus far, has been rather traditionalist. However, under the Trump administration, US representatives have been increasingly vocal in pointing out that NATO member states need to meet the target of spending 2 per cent of their GDP on defence.[101]

[98] U.S. Army, "Enhanced Forward Presence," 25 September 2017, https://www.army.mil/standto/2017-09-25 (accessed 19 February 2018).
[99] U.S. Army, John Strickland, "U.S. Army-led NATO Battle Group on deterrence mission in Poland," 25 September 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/193970/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
[100] This paragraph is based on William Alberque, "'Substantial Combat Forces' in the Context of NATO-Russia Relations," Nato Defence College Research Paper 131, June 2016.
[101] Mike Winnerstig, "USA," in Krister Pallin (ed.), *Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av Nordeuropa 2017*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2018, FOI-R--4563--SE, 162.

4.3 The US and the existing CAC and CSBM agreements

It is fair to say that for many years the US has used the OSCE as a vehicle for arms control issues, although the emphasis on the humanitarian dimension has also always been strong. In practice, this currently entails US efforts that focus on the 1990 CFE Treaty, the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies (on aerial inspections), and the 2011 Vienna Document (on confidence and security building measures).

The US reports annually on adherence to and compliance with all these and other arms control treaties and commitments. "Adherence to" indicates a non-legally binding political treaty, whereas "compliance with" indicates a treaty which is legally binding under international agreements. In terms of the special report on compliance with the CFE Treaty, the 2017 report very clearly singles out Russia as the primary country of concern for the US.[102] This report was published in January 2017, which means that it was prepared by the Obama administration but may have been authorised by the Trump administration.

The US indicates in the report that the Russian 2007 "suspension" (quotation marks from the original text) is in itself a major compliance concern. Russia, in the view of the US, continuously violates the CFE Treaty, does not participate in the CFE Treaty review conferences, and has stated that it will not resume implementation of the treaty. On top of this, the report states that Russia's stationing of its own military forces on the territories of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – all signatories to the CFE Treaty – without the consent of these countries constitutes a clear violation of the treaty itself. This has been met by the US and its NATO allies, the report notes, with both diplomatic "engagement at the most senior levels" (i.e. strong political pressure) and the continuation of US and allied non-implementation of CFE obligations vis-à-vis Russia. In practice, this means that neither the US nor the allies even try to inspect Russia and its armed forces as expected by the Treaty provisions. This policy has been in place since 2011.

Summarising the problems related to Russia, the 2017 report does not mince words:

> Russia's "suspension" of Treaty implementation has seriously eroded the Treaty's verifiability, diminished the exchange of data and notifications, decreased transparency, and undermined the cooperative approach to security that have been core elements of the NATO-Russia relationship and European security for more than two decades.[103]

[102] The following builds on Department of State, "Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Condition (5) (C) Report," January 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270369.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).
[103] Department of State, "Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe…"

The report furthermore states that Russia's stationing of forces on the territory of other states without their consent "destabilizes regional security and has further eroded confidence and stability throughout Europe".[104] Altogether, given these very frank formulations, it is most obvious that the United States considers Russian actions in the field of conventional arms control as a matter of extreme concern.

This impression is reinforced by another 2017 State Department report on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. This report, published in April 2017, covers all the major arms control treaties that the US is a party to, such as the Geneva Protocol, the biological and chemical weapons conventions, the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty of 1987 and several others.[105] The report contains a comprehensive analysis of a number of problems related to these treaties. In the first place, the US considers itself as adhering to and being in compliance with all treaties and commitments it is party to. In the second place, the report points to a number of other countries which in the US view clearly are not in compliance with, or adhering to, a number of these international treaties and agreements.

As usual, Russia is not the only country that the US addresses, but Russia still emerges as by far the biggest problem on the global level. Besides the treaties in focus here, the US State Department finds that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty, considers the Russian suspension of the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) "concerning", and states that it remains "unclear" whether Russia is actually fulfilling its obligations regarding the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.[106]

The criticism regarding Russian violations of the CFE Treaty in the January 2017 State Department report – as discussed above – is reiterated. This means by extension that the Trump administration has accepted and underwritten the Obama administration's findings and conclusions in this context. Furthermore, the April 2017 report also raises considerable concerns about Russian compliance with the 1992 Open Skies (OS) Treaty.[107] Finally, the US considers Russia not to be adhering to a substantial number of principles of the 2011 Vienna Document on CSBMs. Primarily, the report concludes, the Russian "selective implementation" of the Vienna Document provisions, leading to a loss of transparency, limits the effectiveness of the CSBM regime itself.[108]

[104] Department of State, "Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe…"
[105] See Department of State, "2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,"14 April 2017, https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270330.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).
[106] Department of State, "2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control…"
[107] Department of State, "2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control…"
[108] Department of State, "2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control…"

All this means that the US considers Russia as either violating or otherwise in some way not complying with or adhering to six out of the 11 major arms control treaties and agreements that the Department of State oversees in this context. The only treaties that Russia in the US view is not violating are those that deal with strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons (including the 1925 Geneva Protocol). It goes without saying that this is hardly an optimal starting point for new arms control initiatives.

This problem was reflected in a major 2016 speech at an OSCE-related conference on conventional arms control. The speaker was one of the top US arms control actors within the Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bruce Turner at the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. Turner initially outlined all the good sides and strengths of OSCE-oriented arms control on conventional weapons since the 1990s. Quickly, however, his speech turned into a strong indirect attack on Russian actions, very much in line with the official reports analysed above. His conclusion was that any new arms control initiatives are difficult even to contemplate:

> How can we begin to address this situation when one participating State has illegally annexed part of the territory of another participating State and is currently directly involved in destabilizing the east of the same country – or, in more abstract terms, is actively ignoring or contravening the very principles that would need to provide the basis for any new conventional arms control effort?[109]

Within the OSCE, this does not necessarily imply a US position that all the arms control treaties and agreements under its auspices are dead letters. They still provide Europe with considerable stability and transparency in important fields. But the fact that they increasingly do not include one of the two most important actors in the entire space of arms and arms control in Europe – that is, Russia – does make them much less effective in many ways. This is something that most likely not will change very soon.

[109] Bruce I. Turner, "Revitalizing Military Confidence-Building, Risk Reduction, and Arms Control in Europe, Remarks at the OSCE Security Days: Roundtable on Re-launching Conventional Arms Control in the OSCE Context," Vienna, 3 October 2016.

5 European interests

Johan Engvall

The changing security landscape in Europe has led the continent's states to formulate both common and individual policies to meet the new realities. On the one hand, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea, the EU has managed to unite around sanctions on Russia and maintain them for more than three years. On the other hand, the attempt to revive CAC and CSBMs to address the current crisis has been differently received across European capitals. While some states see dialogue and confidence-building as a potential way to re-establish trust and cooperation, others perceive their interests as threatened by a policy of détente and possible agreements with Russia at this point in time. This chapter maps the general security policy goals and military-strategic interests of Germany, France, the UK, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland in relation to CAC and CSBMs.

5.1 Germany

The Steinmeier arms control initiative emerged in response to the question of how to handle the crisis between Russia and the West. Within the German political establishment there is, however, no consensus on whether this approach is the preferred one. Divisions ran deep inside the 2013-2017 coalition government, in particular between the Social Democratic Party (SPD)'s stance as the party of peace and dialogue and the harder line represented by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU).[110] The Defence Ministry, led by the CDU, has committed the German armed forces to NATO's deployment of forces in the Baltic states. For example, from 2017, as part of the NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the form of four multinational battalion-sized battle groups in the Baltic countries and Poland, Germany has led the battle group in Lithuania.[111] In contrast, the SPD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have led the dialogue line towards Russia. In the words of Steinmeier, "security cannot be established

[110] Justyna Gotkowska, "The German initiative for arms control: time for dialogue with Russia," OSW, 9 September 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-09-09/german-initiative-arms-control-time-dialogue-russia (accessed 19 February 2018). These divisions are set to continue since the same parties after lengthy negotiations agreed to form a new coalition government following the German federal elections in September 2017.

[111] NATO, "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence," Fact sheet, May 2017, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

by working against each other", and in times of difficult relations with Russia "we need more not less dialogue".[112] In short, there is a dividing line, or perhaps a division of labour, between the Federal Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry, resulting in a Russia policy that combines deterrence with dialogue.

The White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, released in July 2016, represents an attempt to reconcile deterrence with dialogue in defining Germany's security policy interests in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea. This document confirms the dual nature of German security policy by explicitly calling for a strategy that combines credible deterrence against Russia with dialogue.[113] Germany's search for balance also falls back on the delicate cohabitation between military build-up and diplomacy. On the one hand, Germany has signalled a tentative commitment to the goal of NATO members spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence by 2024, although this remains to be seen given that its military spending in 2016 stood at 1.2 per cent of GDP.[114] On the other hand, there is a firmly established German view that diplomacy and cooperative security, of which CAC and CSBMs are cornerstones, should guide international relations. In this light, the Steinmeier initiative, aiming at change through rapprochement rather than deterrence, connects to key traditional principles of German foreign policy – military restraint, the primacy of diplomacy and multilateralism.[115]

Regarding its NATO commitments, Germany has given priority to measures to enhance the alliance's readiness and force posture to meet the new security challenges. Since 2014, the Bundeswehr has been one of the largest contributors to NATO military deployments along the eastern flank. Its military cooperation with the US has intensified and the White Paper confirms the increasing importance of collective defence. Thus, irrespective of inter-party divisions, Germany is an emerging military player in the Baltic Sea region, supporting measures to increase NATO readiness and adjustments of its force structure to

[112] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, "Relaunching conventional arms control in Europe," 25 November 2016, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/abruestung/161125-ruestungskontrolle/285652 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[113] Federal Government of Germany, *White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 2016, 66. See also Frank-Walter Steinmeier, "More security for everyone in Europe: A call for a re-launch of arms control," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 August 2016.

[114] There are internal divisions on defence spending as well, exemplified by Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel arguing that the 2 per cent target is "entirely unrealistic" and "completely unnecessary" for Germany. He further said that "it would be disastrous if Germany wanted to lead Europe not only economically and politically, but also militarily." See Hanno Kautz, "What is the biggest threat for us? Interview with German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel," *Bild*, 27 January 2017, https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/bild-international/interview-foreign-minister-sigmar-gabriel-54307246.bild.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

[115] Johan Eellend, "Germany – A Long Farewell to Ostpolitik," in Johan Eellend, Niklas H. Rossbach and Anna Sundberg, *The Russian wake-up call to Europe: French, German and British security priorities*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016, FOI-R--4270--SE, 56–57.

meet the demands of the new security policy realities.[116] That said, Germany resists the establishment of permanent military bases in Eastern and Central Europe, arguing that this would violate the agreements of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997.[117] This clearly indicates the combined policy of deterrence and dialogue.

To safeguard a rules-based international order underpinned by norms and values, the German strategic priority is to strengthen global and regional organisations. Germany values the OSCE highly. It emphasises the OSCE's indispensability for the future of comprehensive and cooperative European security as well as Germany's leading role in strengthening the organisation's vital functions, such as its instruments for conflict resolution. Germany links a modernisation of CAC and CSBMs to these objectives.[118] Although Germany acknowledges the uniqueness of the current security landscape, there are nevertheless references to the historical experience of combining dialogue and deterrence during times of greatest pressure, with the Cold War serving as prime example.[119] In sum, the German commitment to CAC and CSBMs has deep roots in the country's foreign policy culture and is therefore likely to remain on the table in some form or the other. What is less clear is whether the German position in the OSCE dialogue represents a coordination of the diplomatic interests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military interests of the Ministry of Defence, or whether the former has carved out CAC and CSBMs as its exclusive diplomatic right.

[116] Eva Hagström Frisell, "Tyskland," in Krister Pallin (ed.), *Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av Nordeuropa 2017*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2018, FOI-R--4563--SE, 121.

[117] See Andrew Rettman, "US and Germany say No to Poland on NATO base," *Euobserver*, 16 April 2016, https://euobserver.com/foreign/133084 (accessed 19 February 2018). Among the leading German proponents of CAC, the main worry is that NATO military deployments along its eastern flank will jeopardise the long-term goal of a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia that Germany long has nurtured and invested in. Not least feared is the collapse of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council.

[118] Federal Government of Germany, *White Paper 2016*, 77–78.

[119] This goes back to the so-called *Ostpolitik* associated with Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt. Formulated in 1969, it was designed to promote "change through rapprochement" (*Wandel durch Annäherung*). The intellectual father of the idea was however Egon Bahr, who served as Secretary of the Chancellor's office under Brandt 1969–72, but had already formulated this line of thinking in 1963. See Egon Bahr, "Wandel durch Annäherung," Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, 15 July 1963, https://www.fes.de/archiv/adsd_neu/inhalt/stichwort/tutzinger_rede.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018). *Ostpolitik* also drew inspiration from the NATO Harmel report in 1967, which like the current German policy, grappled with similar issues relating to NATO's dual approach of pursuing détente and deterrence towards the Soviet-led communist bloc. See NATO, Ministerial Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, "The Harmel Report: full reports by the rapporteurs on the future tasks of the Alliance," Brussels 13–14 December 1967, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/nato-strategy/Harmel_Report_complete.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

5.2 France

Although less active, France's approach to Russia after Crimea resembles Germany's with a combined focus on dialogue and deterrence. That said, it must be kept in mind that France, in comparison with Germany, takes a different approach to international security. As a permanent nuclear-armed member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), France nurtures its identity as a leading international actor with a particular strategic autonomy.[120] France is the European country with the strongest international military commitment. In late 2015 around 20,000 French soldiers were deployed outside Europe with the fight against terrorism. The country's threat perception pays comparatively less attention to Russia and the east, looking instead primarily southwards – to Africa (North Africa and the Sahel) and the Middle East. The White Paper on Defence and National Security of 2013, initiated under François Hollande's presidential tenure, clearly spelt out this geostrategic priority.[121]

Since 2014, France has repeatedly condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea and voiced its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity. Together with Germany, Russia and Ukraine, France participated in the negotiations leading to the Minsk 2 ceasefire agreement for eastern Ukraine. Following the election of President Emmanuel Macron, a Strategic Review of Defence and National Security was published in October 2017. The review notes that Russia seeks to weaken the transatlantic link and divide the EU. By the use of intimidating measures, Russia is actively trying to expand its sphere of influence in several directions.[122] That said, when Macron presented his initiative for a sovereign, united and democratic Europe in September 2017, the external outlook focused on the terrorist threat and the migration challenge. As a result, what Europe needs is "an external policy focused on a few priorities: firstly, the Mediterranean and Africa".[123] Thus, compared to Germany, the eastern vector is not so pronounced in France's security policy calculations.

Relations between France and the US have improved in the past decade, aided not least by finding common ground in the fight against terrorism. France has been fully reintegrated into the NATO command structure since 2009. At the same time, it stands outside the alliance's Nuclear Planning Group. In its ambition for an ever-closer European Union, France continues to harbour visions of a European defence. A partial French victory was won at the end of 2017

[120] Anna Sundberg, "France – Between North and South, and Everywhere," in Eellend, Rossbach and Sundberg, *The Russian wake-up call to Europe*, 17–54.
[121] Présidence de la Republique, *The French White Paper on defence and national security – 2013*.
[122] République Française, *Revue strátegique de defense et de sécurité nationale 2017*, 42.
[123] "President Macron's Initiative for Europe: A sovereign, united, democratic Europe," 26 September 2017, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/european-union/events/article/president-macron-s-initiative-for-europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-europe (accessed 19 February 2018).

when 25 EU member states agreed to the Franco-German proposal to launch the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defence.[124] Its embrace of European defence notwithstanding, NATO is France's security guarantee. The French view on NATO is that the alliance is about solidarity and shared responsibilities. French representatives have carefully emphasised that the country is strongly against a regionalisation of the alliance in the sense of a division of responsibilities for different regions among the members.[125] Consequently, France contributes 300 soldiers to the UK-led battle group in Estonia.[126]

Notwithstanding significant differences in geographical and thematic priorities, France supports the discussions on CAC and CSBMs within the OSCE's structured dialogue. In the words of France's Permanent Representative to the UN: "There can be no strategic stability without a set of common rules to frame military competition." In order to move towards such stability, discussions on arms control, confidence-building, transparency and risk-reduction measures within the OSCE are considered important tools.[127] However, while France supports CAC in Europe on principle, it does not see a strong link between it and its own primary national security interests. The security risks posed by Russia's behaviour are subordinated to terrorism and migration with a geographical orientation to Africa and the Middle East.

5.3 The United Kingdom

In the past year, UK foreign and security policy has been overshadowed by Brexit and the subsequent management of the pending separation from the EU. Amidst the domestic upheavals following Brexit, international defence and security matters are less urgent policy priorities.[128] On the international arena, the UK's status as well as its ultimate guarantee against potential adversaries rests on

[124] Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, "Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense?" Policy Brief, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 6 October 2017, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/can-france-and-germany-make-pesco-work-process-toward-eu-defense (accessed 19 February 2018). PESCO represents a binding commitment among the 25 member states to improve their defence cooperation.

[125] Sundberg, "France – Between North and South, and Everywhere," 42.

[126] NATO, "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence."

[127] "The OSCE is essential for security in Europe," Briefing in the presence of the Austrian OSCE Presidency – Statement by Mr François Delattre, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Security Council, 22 February 2017, https://onu.delegfrance.org/The-OSCE-is-essential-for-security-in-Europe (accessed 19 February 2018).

[128] Malcolm Chalmers, "UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit," *RUSI Briefing Paper*, January 2017, 3, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_bp_uk_foreign_and_security_policy_after_brexit_v4.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

the nuclear deterrent.[129] The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review adopted in 2015 highlights the need to strengthen the UK military posture, which includes increasing defence spending to continue to meet the NATO target of 2 per cent of GDP and investing in capable and flexible armed forces.[130] From a military-strategic point of view, the UK aspires to increase its NATO commitments, in particular its relations with the US and France.[131] Strong cooperation with allies is also required in order to respond in a robust manner to state-based threats.

Regarding the resurgence of state-based threats, these are primarily associated with Russian behaviour in Ukraine, which has led to the unravelling of the rules-based international order.[132] In the National Security Strategy, Russia is described as increasingly "aggressive, authoritarian and nationalistic". In the context of Russian aggression, the government is mindful of the British commitments made when leading the 2014 Wales NATO summit, including the common defence investment pledge, the institution of a Readiness Action Plan, the establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and the UK's contributions to the NATO Air Policing Mission in the Baltic countries.[133] Since then, as part of the decision in 2016 to deploy the NATO eFP battalions to the Baltic states and Poland, the UK has taken the leading role in NATO's eFP in Estonia.[134] For the UK, the Baltic Sea region is important in a military-strategic perspective, not least as a transport route for receiving and providing military assistance.[135] In the context of the NATO promise to support allies in times of crises, Russia's deployment of long-range missiles in Kaliningrad and St Petersburg, amongst other places, raises concerns for UK and other allies' abilities to operate in the area.

---

[129] United Kingdom. *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, November 2015, 11, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478936/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_PRINT_only.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

[130] It should be noted, however, that according to SIPRI figures UK defence spending in 2015 and 2016 amounted to 1.9 per cent of GDP, while NATO data reported 2.1 per cent and 2.2 per cent for respective years. The explanation for this discrepancy goes back to an approved change of calculation method for NATO reporting that included war pensions, contributions to UN peace supporting operations, pensions for the Ministry of Defence's civilian staff and certain revenues from the Ministry of Defence. See Juuko Alozius, "Försvarsekonomi I focus: Storbritannien," *FOI Memo 6118*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, September 2017.

[131] *National Security Strategy*, 10–11.

[132] *National Security Strategy*, 15.

[133] *National Security Strategy*, 18, 20.

[134] "British troops arrive in Estonia to deter Russian aggression in one of the biggest deployments to the region in decades," *The Telegraph*, 18 March 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/18/british-troops-arrive-estonia-deter-russian-aggression-one-biggest/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

[135] Niklas H. Rossbach, "Storbritannien," in Pallin (ed.), 151.

Overall, the UK appears to take a sceptical position on the German CAC initiative. It belongs to the group of NATO countries, in the first instance together with the US and Poland, that question the timing of re-launching arms control when Russia is breaching several of the principles and treaties underpinning European security.

5.4 Poland

Polish security essentially rests on three basic pillars: a national defence capability, the collective defence of NATO, and regional cooperation. Taken together, the three pillars have produced a security policy aimed at strengthening NATO's military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. The alliance's decision at the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016 to establish a stronger military presence in the Baltic countries and Poland was therefore seen as the most significant military-political success for Poland since it achieved NATO membership in 1999.[136]

Domestic politics in Poland has taken a highly polarised turn after the change of government in 2015. Even though security and defence policy has remained less affected by the antagonistic political climate than other policy fields, the governing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc) party has nonetheless spent considerable energy on trying to distance itself from its predecessor in this field.[137] In 2016, the Ministry of Defence undertook a strategic review leading to a new defence concept in May 2017. The concept specifies that Poland must adjust its defence policy to acquire stronger national defence capabilities and intensify cooperation with allies at a time of increasingly severe security threats.[138]

There is no doubt that the aggressive policy of Russia, which aims "to create a new international order based on the so called 'concert of powers'", is perceived as the main threat to Poland's national security.[139] If anything, since the change of government, Poland has consolidated its standing as perhaps the most vocal European voice warning of the threat Russia poses to European security. Its primary security goal is, therefore, to deter Russian aggression through strong national defence and ever-stronger support from NATO allies. Poland is one of the few NATO members currently spending 2 per cent of GDP on its defence.

[136] Ministry of National Defence, "The Warsaw NATO Summit and Its Implications for the Polish-American Bilateral Relationship," 22 July 2016, http://en.mon.gov.pl/news/article/latest-news/the-warsaw-nato-summit-and-its-implications-for-the-polish-american-bilateral-relationship-u2016-07-25/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
[137] Anna Sundberg, "Polen," in Pallin (ed.), 101.
[138] Ministry of National Defence, *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, May 2017.
[139] Ministry of National Defence, *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, 23.

Thus, in present circumstances, security is assured through stronger military presence rather than dialogue.

For the Polish government, it is of paramount importance that the Baltic Sea region remains firmly attached to the US and NATO as a whole, ruling out any option of regionalising security. To this end, it is putting substantial efforts into developing a special relationship with the US, including providing a facility for missile defence on its territory and expanding the US presence in the country through headquarters, battle groups, an air presence and the deployment of military hardware. Thus, Poland is purposefully building up its capability to offer host nation support for NATO troops.[140] Cooperation is also intensifying with countries identified as "like-minded" in their perception of the Russian threat, i.e. the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria. A particular source of concern for Poland is Russia's militarisation of the neighbouring Kaliningrad region, including the deployment of nuclear-capable Iskander missiles and the latest S-400 Triumph air defence system.[141]

Explicitly addressing the existing CAC and CSBMs, the Polish National Security Strategy, approved in November 2014, noted that those instruments have weakened in Europe. It adds, moreover, that existing CAC and CSBMs are used in an instrumental manner, i.e. "for the purpose of legitimising often intense military activities". An equally pessimistic stance is taken on the ability of the OSCE to utilise its potential for conflict resolution in the coming years, given that its "actual effectiveness depends on the commitments of participating countries".[142] Given the investments in domestic military modernisation mentioned above, as well as in facilitating access for allied reinforcements, from Poland's point of view the major security concerns will not be not resolved by a new CAC or additional CSBMs. In plain language, the kind of restrictions on military capabilities that would be the objective of a new CAC regime are far from compatible with the government's military-strategic priorities.

[140] Laura Smith-Spark and Atika Shubert, "Poland welcomes thousands of US troops in NATO show of force," *CNN*, 14 January 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/14/europe/poland-us-troops-nato-welcome/index.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

[141] Katie Forster, "How a tiny pocket of Russian land next to Poland could soon become the most dangerous place in Europe," *The Independent*, 28 October 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/russia-military-base-europe-putin-build-up-tensions-west-uk-kaliningrad-a7384571.html (accessed 19 February 2018); Alexandra Sims, "Poland 'highly concerned' after Russia moves nuclear-capable missiles into Kaliningrad," *The Independent*, 8 October 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-highly-concerned-after-russia-moves-nuclear-capable-missiles-into-kaliningrad-a7352151.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

[142] *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2014*, Warsaw 2014, 22, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS_RP.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

5.5 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

While the Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are historically, culturally and politically very different, they all share the geopolitical fate of being small neighbours of Russia.[143] They all perceive Russia's aggressive foreign policy, most notably its military modernisation and increasing military activities, including snap exercises in the vicinity of the Baltic Sea, as a real threat to their sovereignty.[144] Among the eastern NATO members, the Baltic countries are militarily, politically and economically most vulnerable to Russian pressure.[145] The military aggression Russia is conducting in Ukraine is seen as particularly threatening from the Baltic perspective. As an insurance against possible Russian intentions and capabilities, the three states have united in their request for an enhanced NATO military presence in the region.[146] This appeal was partially approved at the Warsaw summit in 2016 when NATO committed to an eFP in the Baltic states and Poland.[147] The Baltic countries have also worked diligently to promote a united EU and NATO line against Russia in order to secure a multinational commitment to NATO's Article 5, the collective defence clause that states that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all.

Against this backdrop, the Baltic countries are especially afraid of any kind of regional arrangements that would potentially restrict NATO's freedom of movement and collective defence of the region. For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the NATO umbrella is absolutely vital, and any agreement or understanding that would risk removing this umbrella is therefore an absolute red line.[148] Their security policy rationale is to avoid military attack by virtue of being members of NATO. A study commissioned by the Estonian Parliament, back in 2012, noted the Baltic countries' concern over the growing imbalance of forces between Russia and NATO in the region, as well as the obstacles to the alliance sending reinforcements to the region posed by Russia's deployment of advanced military equipment along the borders.[149] Russia placing state-of-the-art

[143] Robert Dalsjö, "Baltikum," in Pallin (ed.), *Västlig militär förmåga*, 79.
[144] See the official security policy documents of respective state. Riigikogu, *National Security Concept of Estonia 2010*; Saeima, *The National Defence Concept* (of Latvia, 2016); and Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, "Seimas approved the National Security Strategy," Press release of the Lithuanian Parliament, 17 January 2017.
[145] Robert Dalsjö, *Brännpunkt Baltikum*, Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2016, FOI-R--4278--SE, 11.
[146] Benjamin Oreskes, "Exposed Baltics seek NATO help to combat Russia threat," *Politico*, 26 February 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/exposed-baltics-seek-nato-help-to-combat-russia-threat/ (accessed 19 February 2018); Dalsjö, *Brännpunkt Baltikum*.
[147] See Paragraph 40 in NATO, "Warsaw Summit Communique," 9 July 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).
[148] For the Baltic countries' military dependence on NATO, see Dalsjö, *Brännpunkt Baltikum*.
[149] Riina Kaljurand, Karlis Neretnieks, Bo Ljung and Julian Tupay, "Developments in the Security Environment of the Baltic Sea Region up to 2020," International Centre for Defence Studies, September 2012, 63.

missiles in Kaliningrad and St Petersburg may create a so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble, challenging the Western ability to establish air supremacy in the Baltic Sea region, and to reinforce and resupply the Baltic countries in the event of an emergency.[150] Freezing the current military imbalance in a special regional agreement, in which the Baltic Sea region runs the risk of being decoupled from the hard security guarantees of the transatlantic link, would therefore be a nightmare scenario. As for their own military capabilities, these are restricted to delaying a potential aggressor until military assistance from allies could be provided. The Baltic countries have become among the world leaders in growth of military spending, with all countries' defence expenditures estimated to reach at least 2 per cent of GDP in 2018.[151]

Unlike Germany, France, the UK and Poland, the Baltic states are not parties to the CFE Treaty, only the OS Treaty and the Vienna Document. They were formally removed from the CFE Treaty in October 1991 amid fears that their participation in the bloc-based treaty would give Russia continued military and political influence in the region.[152] While remaining outside the CFE Treaty, Estonia and Lithuania, but not Latvia, concluded bilateral CSBMs with Russia in 1998 and 2001, respectively.[153] In 2006, Russia decided not to prolong the bilateral arrangement with Estonia, which had allowed for one additional evaluation visit per year and exchange of additional information according to CFE Treaty requirements.[154] The agreement between Lithuania and Russia provided for the exchange of information on conventional armed forces of Lithuania and Russia's Kaliningrad region as well as one additional inspection visit each year on the basis of the Vienna Document. However, information exchange stopped after Russia suspended the CFE Treaty in 2007, and the additional evaluation was renounced by Russia in 2014, to the regret of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry.[155]

[150] Ian Williams, "The Russia-NATO A2AD Environment," Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Project, 3 January 2017, https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-nato-a2ad-environment/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

[151] For example, in the last five years Lithuania's defence spending has increased more than three-fold, taking its share of GDP from less than 1 per cent in 2013 to slightly more than 2 per cent for 2018.

[152] Zdzislaw Lachowski, *The Adapted CFE Treaty and the Admission of the Baltic States to NATO*, Stockholm: SIPRI, December 2002, 21.

[153] Zdzislaw Lachowski, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 142.

[154] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the OSCE, "Information exchange of the code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security," April 2017, 20, http://www.osce.org/forum-for-security-cooperation/319436?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

[155] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, "Lithuania regrets Russia's decision which reduces transparency," 5 May 2014, http://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-regrets-russias-decision-which-reduces-transparency (accessed 19 February 2018).

Suspicious of Russian intentions and from a position of military inferiority and geographical exposure, the Baltic governments, fearing any restrictions on their ability to receive outside military support in the event of crisis, responded with caution to Germany's CAC initiative. There were, however, differences of opinions among the respective foreign ministries. For example, Lithuania's Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius responded with scepticism, noting that Russia's poor record in complying with international norms and principles should serve as a warning of the dangers of not being consistent in not rewarding Russian non-compliance. In contrast, Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs expressed greater understanding for Steinmeier's initiative, arguing that it is important to find a balance between reinforcing European security and defence, and having a dialogue with Russia.[156]

5.6 Finland

The government report on Finnish foreign and security policy from 2016 notes that the cooperative security regime, "based on the principles of shared security as well as arms reduction treaties and confidence-building measures", has been challenged and destabilised by Russia.[157] These changes, particularly in Finland's vicinity, mean that "[t]he use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded."[158] Finland's security policy primarily addresses the interlinked factors of the crumbling cooperative security order in Europe, the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region and Russia's demonstrated willingness and capability to employ military force to establish a security regime based on spheres of interest.[159] To counter these challenges, Finland's regional security policy emphasises two aspects. First, the OSCE's broad concept of security must be maintained as the baseline for continued cooperative security.[160] Second, while remaining militarily non-aligned, Finland pursues ever deeper military cooperation with the US and NATO, exemplified by the signing of Host Nation Support Agreements (HNSAs) during the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. The agreements enable Finland, like Sweden, to benefit from NATO's support in crisis situations.[161] Securing a special status in its relationship with the US is critical for Finland's military security. Thus, its non-

[156] *Latvian Public Broadcasting*, "Germany's Steinmeier: NATO needs Russia dialogue," 13 September 2016, http://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/germanys-steinmeier-nato-needs-russia-dialogue.a200602/ (accessed 19 February 2018).
[157] Prime Minister's Office, *Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*, 9/2016, 11.
[158] Prime Minister's Office, *Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*, 11.
[159] Prime Minister's Office, *Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*, 22.
[160] Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Review on Finland's Security Cooperation*, 2015.
[161] Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz, "Between Military Non-Alignment and Integration," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Comments 25*, April 2015, 3, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C25_etz_opt.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

aligned status notwithstanding, Finland does not differ from the Baltic nations or Poland in the sense that a strong transatlantic link is profoundly important for maintaining security in the Baltic Sea region.[162] The special priority given to bilateral cooperation with Sweden is firmly anchored to this reality.

As a militarily non-aligned country, Finland has never been a state party to the CFE Treaty. From the Finnish perspective, the CFE Treaty's comprehensive exchange of military information and verification measures were non-compatible with the basic elements of the nation's defence system, based on compulsory military service and mobilisation. Opening weapon and equipment stores for verification would increase the risk of a potential enemy carrying out a strategic strike against those targets.[163] As stated clearly in the Foreign Ministry's Review on Finland's security cooperation: "Because of the special features of the defence system, in-depth verification methods included in conventional arms control regimes are challenging for Finland."[164] In the OSCE work on CSBMs, however, Finland takes an active role, within the framework of both the Vienna Document and the OS Treaty. With regard to Russia, there exist two bilateral arrangements between Finland and Russia.[165] For Finland, increased military activity in the Baltic Sea region raises fears of unintentional escalation stemming from lack of communication or accidents.[166] To avoid such a scenario, Finland stresses the need to reinforce dialogue and confidence building with Russia, while condemning its actions in Ukraine. Finnish President Sauli Niinistö has proposed that one step to increase trust in the region would be for aircraft to use transponders over the Baltic Sea as a confidence-building measure.[167]

Regarding the dialogue on renewing conventional arms control in Europe, the Finnish position holds that it is primarily the responsibility of the OSCE participating states to find the way forward.[168] This point of view could be

[162] Regeringskansliet, *Nationell säkerhetsstrategi*, January 2017, 15; *Government Report of Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*, 12.

[163] Pentti Olin, "A Finnish perspective of the CFE Treaty," *Baltic Defence Review*, No. 4 (2000): 69.

[164] Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Review on Finland's Security Cooperation*, 35.

[165] The first agreement, operational since 2000, allows for one additional annual evaluation visit on the basis of the Vienna Document. It should be noted that the Finnish visit only applies to the Leningrad Military District. The second agreement, concluded in 2002, includes biannual exchange of naval visits to Finnish bases at Upinniemi or Pansio and Russian bases at Kaliningrad or Kronstadt (Lachowski, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe*, 144).

[166] Timo Soini, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, "The Sea of Change," *The Security Times*, 17 February 2017, https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/MSC_/2017/Sonstiges/ST_Feb2017_double_page.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

[167] *Yle*, "Putin agrees to Finnish proposal on aircraft transponders," 1 July 2016, https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/putin_agrees_to_finnish_proposal_on_aircraft_transponders/8999141 (accessed 19 February 2018).

[168] Timo Kantola, "Possible New Negotiations on Conventional Arms Control – A Finnish View," in Wolfgang Zellner (ed.), *Conventional Arms Control in Europe: New Approaches in Challenging Times*, Hamburg: CORE Working Paper 26, September 2015, 29-30.

interpreted as a signal that it is not in Finland's interest to see the initiative being taken in a supranational direction under the leadership of, for example, the OSCE Secretariat. While Finland has declared a willingness to take part in the process, it is careful not to link its potential involvement to any commitment to acceding to a final agreement. This represents a logical application of the Finnish middle way of balancing "the need to protect the special features of the defence system with the exchange of critical military information within the security environment of Finland".[169] Recalling Finland's maintained focus on defence of its territory, compulsory military service and mobilisation, the country's reluctance to subordinate its military forces to a possible future CAC regime with intrusive inspections appears to remain as valid today as it was 25 years ago.

[169] Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Review on Finland's Security Cooperation*, 35.

6 Conclusions

Johan Engvall, Gudrun Persson, Robert Dalsjö, Carolina Vendil Pallin and Mike Winnerstig

6.1 Security policy goals

Russia perceives the current European security order as rigged in favour of Euro-Atlantic organisations. In its place, Russia is actively seeking to establish an alternative order that would grant Moscow a sphere of privileged interests in its near abroad. As part of this objective, Russia would like to have a future veto on further NATO enlargement. In other words, Russia would like to redefine the OSCE concept of indivisible security to mean that no alliance should be allowed to increase its security at the expense of another alliance.

The Russian vision for the OSCE concept of comprehensive security is also distinctly different. From Russia's point of view, the OSCE should be designed as an organisation focusing on hard security, while the normative agenda should be either downplayed or reformed to better mirror Russian interests. For Moscow, the third dimension of the OSCE's comprehensive security concept – dealing with promotion of democracy and human rights – represents one way in which the West seeks to undermine Russia. A manifestation of this view was the ruling of the Russian Constitutional Court in July 2015 that the Russian Constitution is superior to the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

The United States, on the other hand, wants to defend and uphold the post-Cold War European security order. While the Trump administration, in power for less than a year, has still to produce a formal policy in the field of European arms control issues, it would be surprising if the eventual Trump policies deviate greatly from the general thrust of earlier administrations' efforts.[170] The US must, also under the Trump administration, be considered a status quo power in the field of European security. This means that the policies of the US are directed towards the safeguarding of the general peace and arms control efforts of post-Cold War Europe, efforts that were constructed essentially under US leadership

[170] An example of this might be the new National Security Strategy, scheduled for launch in late December 2017. According to press reports, this strategy will underline the importance of allies and will be critical toward Russian actions and policies. See e.g. Caroline Houck, "Allies Are Key, Says Trump's National Security Strategy", *Defense One*, 13 December 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2017/12/allies-are-key-says-trumps-national-security-strategy/144508/?oref=search_mcmaster (accessed 19 February 2018).

more than 25 years ago. This means that US support for NATO, the OSCE, and the arms control treaties related to these organisations is unwavering.

This posture today also entails a clearly negative view of Russia and Russian actions in the arms control field and elsewhere. The fact that US-Russian strategic nuclear arms control cooperation continues to work relatively well does not translate into a fertile ground for US-Russian, or anyone else's, initiatives on the CAC arena in Europe and/or under OSCE auspices. It could be argued quite to the contrary that the strong US endorsement of the comprehensive and cooperative European security order means that CAC and CSBMs cannot be pursued in isolation from these broader security ramifications.

Turning to Europe, Germany, through the efforts of the SPD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the initiator and driving force in the dialogue on CAC and CSBMs in Europe. CAC is emphasised as a cornerstone in Germany's attempt to strengthen cooperative security even in times of greatest pressure. The lingering question is whether the German proponents of CAC will aspire to a new treaty on CAC or if they are content with keeping an open dialogue with Russia. There may even be intra-ministry differences related to whether this is a result-driven or process-driven initiative. On the general level of German policy, the outstanding uncertainty is the extent to which the Foreign Ministry's initiative on arms control and dialogue is anchored within the German armed forces. Amongst the other European countries examined here, the smaller states in the Baltic Sea region – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and to a certain extent Finland – communicate security perceptions similar to that of the US in relation to Russia's behaviour. They have all formulated national policies seeking to strengthen their military capabilities as well as pushing for regional cooperation and an active NATO. They also share a sceptical view of the prospects for a new CAC regime in a situation where Russia has violated existing agreements. Within Europe, this position dovetails particularly closely with the policies of the UK and Poland.

6.2 CAC and CSBMs in times of confrontation

Regarding talks on arms control, including CAC and CSBMs, the US remains Russia's main point of reference. In this great-power perspective, other participating states are generally reduced to useful tools for either the US or Russia. Moscow is primarily interested in restricting additional military reinforcements by NATO to the alliance members in Russia's immediate neighbourhood. Considering the military modernisation programme undertaken by Russia since 2008, a preferable outcome for Russia would be to freeze the military build-up in NATO member states, thereby maintaining the numerical advantage acquired in recent years. At the same time, Russia would like to include in the discussion emergent as well as complementary capabilities, including high-precision weapons systems and naval forces – something NATO

members in all likelihood will not even be prepared to open discussions on. However, it should be recalled that Russia's policy to a certain degree thrives on ambiguity and unpredictability in the military domain, leaving the kind of transparency and oversight measures associated with CAC and CSBMs of limited value.

The policies of the US aim to safeguard the arms control efforts and the post-Cold War European security order. Its priorities therefore remain to support NATO, the OSCE and the arms control treaties associated with these organisations. In the current political-military situation, the US takes a clear position on the prospects for negotiations with Russia on CAC and CSBMs: Russia's violation of existing principles and treaties cannot be taken as point of departure for any future negotiations. Accordingly, CAC and CSBMs only fulfil a function in the context of a rules-based order, in which key actors respect the basic rules of interaction.

There is no European line on CAC and CSBMs: there are divisions within NATO as well as the EU. Germany, through the work of the SPD and certain parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the key driver of the process. The country is responsible not only for formulating the initiative in the first place, but also for providing most of the input to the process. Under German direction conferences are organised and policy papers written to generate new ideas on the relevance of CAC. The main German allies in the endeavour seem to be Austria – with an active role in 2017 as the Chair in Office (CiO) of the OSCE – and Switzerland. At the same time, there is no consensus on the German policy. Through the CDU and the Federal Chancellery, Germany has endorsed NATO's deterring military presence in the Baltic Sea region.

Positioned at the opposite end of the spectrum are the UK, Poland and the Baltic countries. They all share the assessment of the US that Russia's behaviour is likely to preclude negotiations on arms control for the foreseeable future. Instead of seeking détente, they first of all pursue a policy line of deterrence, with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland pushing NATO to commit to an enhanced forward presence in the Baltic Sea region, in which the UK took a leading European role for 2017. In between these two positions fall France and Finland. They both support the Steinmeier initiative in principle, while concomitantly taking a less active approach to the process. This can be explained by the fact that both countries' security policy priorities and military-strategic considerations are only weakly linked to CAC. In the case of France, it falls back on threat perceptions, such as terrorism and migration, originating south of the EU rather than to its east. Finland's interest is tempered by hard military considerations. The special features of its national defence system are difficult to match with the kind of intrusive verification inspections connected to arms control agreements.

6.2.1 Territorial conflicts

The emergence and consolidation of contested territories outside state control in the former Soviet space is a thorn in the flesh for security in the OSCE area. On the road ahead, it seems implausible that CAC negotiations can be divorced from political disagreements inside the OSCE on how to draw the borders in the regions of unresolved conflicts. Russia is intent on keeping these unresolved conflicts as its own pawns. Moscow has actively supported and acknowledged the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia as well as supported separatist movements in the Transnistrian region of Moldova. The annexation of Crimea and military aggression in the Donbas region of Ukraine have extended these territorial conflicts further in Europe. Russia has clearly stated its refusal to discuss ending its military presence in these regions. For military-strategic reasons as well as because of domestic political dynamics, it must be considered highly unlikely that Moscow will change its policy on this issue. On the face of it, Russia would prefer the frozen conflicts to be treated as technical rather than political obstacles.

At the same time, a so-called status-neutral depoliticisation of the frozen conflicts would ignore the root of the problem. A deep geopolitical and normative confrontation underscores the military agenda of all OSCE participating states. The revisiting of CAC and CSBMs in Europe was prompted by Russia's annexation of Crimea, an act that exposed the gulf between Russia and the absolute majority of participating states. Nonetheless, a closer look inside the Western group reveals that two opposing perceptions of reality arguably stand against each other in relation to the unresolved conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine.

The group led by Germany's Foreign Ministry sees the escalating political-military tensions, possibly leading to large-scale military conflict, between Russia and the West as the major problem. It would therefore seem that a normalisation of the relationship is the main priority. A dialogue on CAC and CSBMs could be a potential icebreaker, particularly if it is depoliticised and disentangled from the territorial conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. The idea of approaching these conflicts from a status-neutral perspective represents one way of separating discussions on arms control from the infected issue of how to resolve these conflicts.

The other group, mainly led by the US, the UK, Poland and the Baltic states, sees Russia's acts of aggression and its violations of the rules of interaction between states as the core problem. Russia's behaviour has triggered a systemic crisis, at the heart of which are the illegal annexation of Crimea, the military instigation of rebellion in Donbas, the occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the issue of the Transnistria region in Moldova. Discussions on European security in general and CAC and CSBMs in particular cannot be allowed to directly or indirectly legitimise Russia's violations of neighbouring

countries' sovereign rights to territorial integrity and their right to make their own security policy choices freely. Unless Russia is held accountable for its actions, comprehensive and cooperative European security is jeopardised.

To summarise, reducing territorial conflicts to technicalities handled during negotiations would represent a gain for Russia. At the same time, it would be delusional to believe that Moscow would reciprocate such a move by accepting the OSCE's normative agenda and the comprehensive and cooperative security concept. Rather, in Russia's eyes, it would vindicate its demand for an exclusive sphere of interests in its neighbourhood as well as its view of the international system as a whole as one where small states are expected to yield to the demands of more powerful neighbours.

6.2.2 The Baltic Sea region

The Baltic Sea region has emerged as a geopolitical focal point in the stand-off between Russia and the West. To de-escalate mounting tensions, there are proposals for certain sub-regional CAC arrangements on the Baltic Sea region. In search of positive experiences, proponents within the OSCE have mentioned the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina as a potential model for the Baltic Sea region. However, it must be stressed that the Dayton Agreement was adopted in a radically different environment, characterised by parties with a thoroughly documented inability to handle regional security without a solution being imposed on the region from the outside. In the Baltic Sea region, on the other hand, there exists a cooperative culture based on broader peace-supporting principles of free exchanges in the realms of politics, economics and security. Moreover, unlike the Dayton Agreement, no outside parties could impose a sub-regional order around the Baltic Sea. Indeed, Germany, Russia and the US are all major players in the region.

From Russia's point of view, a regional solution for the Baltic Sea should include constraints on NATO deployment of additional military forces to the region, not least naval forces. For Russia, an ideal solution would be to preclude the region's non-aligned nations joining NATO. In contrast, the Baltic countries are firmly against any kind of regional arrangements that would potentially restrict NATO's freedom of movement in the Baltic Sea region or in any way undermine the credibility of NATO's Article 5.

The same resistance to the idea of special CAC arrangements for the Baltic Sea region is found in Poland and Finland. The latter remains outside NATO but, just like Sweden, pursues ever-deeper military cooperation with the US and the alliance, exemplified by the signing of Host Nation Support Agreements (HNSAs) during the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. The agreements enable Finland and Sweden to benefit from NATO's support in crises. Thus, even non-NATO Finland and Sweden do not differ from the Baltic nations or Poland in the

sense that a strong transatlantic link is crucial for security in the Baltic Sea region.

For the US, the UK and France, the Baltic Sea region is crucial for the credibility of NATO as an organisation. The decision at the 2016 Warsaw NATO summit on an eFP along the eastern flank of the alliance expressed NATO solidarity and continued commitment to Eastern Europe. For the EU members in the Baltic Sea region, uncertainties regarding Russia's A2/AD capabilities – and their implications for Western reinforcements in the region – further underline the importance of a united NATO and of the US remaining committed to Europe.

6.2.3 Way forward or wishful thinking?

A multifaceted set of developments has contributed to the erosion of existing CAC and CSBM arrangements. First, and foremost, the Soviet Union no longer exists, nor does the WP. Instead, the former WP member countries are now part of an enlarged NATO closer to Russia's borders. Even though there are no longer two blocs, the reality is that there is a current confrontation between Russia and the West. The two sides differ on the sources and nature of the challenges to European security. Russia and the West also have different visions for the European security order. Russia strives for the creation of a balance of power reminiscent of the historical experience of the Concert of Europe. The Western priority, on the other hand, albeit with different Western states advocating somewhat different strategies and tactics, is to defend the comprehensive and cooperative security order of the post-Cold War era. The US position is particularly clear in arguing that specific treaties in the field of arms control are only meaningful if embedded in a rules-based security order. Taken together, these major differences, in threat perceptions and security policy responses, undermine the prospects for talks on CAC and CSBMs.

In a historical perspective, the incentive structures in present-day Europe differ from those of the early 1970s and the negotiations that eventually resulted in the HFA of 1975 or, for that matter, from those existing at the time of the adoption of the Paris Charter, the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document amid the collapsing communist bloc in Eastern Europe in 1990. In 1975, there was a mutual interest in a grand bargain whereby the West acknowledged Soviet superiority in the east in exchange for transparency. In 1990, the idea of a European continent whole, free and at peace enabled comprehensive and cooperative security to blossom. Today, the problem is of a different nature in the sense that agreements exist, but Russia is actively choosing not to implement some of them on the grounds that they do not support Russian security interests. It is thus difficult to imagine any breakthroughs as long as Russia wants to have a security order that is fundamentally at odds with the principal documents regulating European security.

What would it take for all parties to respect a new CAC regime or additional CSBMs? In general, the prospects are constrained by the sheer variety of states participating in the dialogue. Indeed, what are technical issues for some states will be existential ones for others, depending on size, geography, historical experiences and domestic politics. Moreover, as long as the two principal actors – Russia and the US – sit on the sidelines discussions on CAC will not move beyond discussions among the converted. The two most powerful Western sceptics – the US and the UK – argue that, since Russia has demonstrated that it is prepared to violate existing treaties, the fundamental question relates to how it can be guaranteed that new regimes would not meet a similar fate. In other words, as long as Russia plays by its own rules, inventing a new set of common rules is pointless. Thus, a conclusion from this study is that the preconditions for initiating negotiations on arms control in the OSCE are not in place at this particular point in time.

The conclusions reached in this study raise a few questions that merit further examination. One is the German question. As the driving force behind re-launching a dialogue on CAC and CSBMs, a future study should look more closely at the positions of different parts of the German political establishment. This could include the extent to which the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces are consulted in Berlin's diplomatic efforts in the field of CAC and CSBMs. This point is not restricted to Germany alone. Overall, there is a potential friction between the diplomatic interest of dialogue and negotiation on the one hand and the hard military security interests of states on the other hand. There is surely research to be done on how different states handle this dilemma and to what degree they integrate military representatives in the diplomatic work, for example within the structured dialogue. Finally, this study has incorporated NATO in the analysis in an indirect manner, noting how selected members of the alliance pursue their interests either through the alliance or in relation to it. However, NATO's position, as an organisation, on the OSCE dialogue on current and future security threats in Europe could be an interesting subject for study as the process moves on.

7 References

Acton, James M. *Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011.

Alberque, William. "'Substantial Combat Forces' in the Context of NATO-Russia Relations." *NATO Defence College Research Paper 131*. June 2016.

Alozius, Juuko. "Försvarsekonomi i fokus: Storbritannien." *FOI Memo 6118*. Swedish Defence Research Agency. September 2017.

Anichkina, Tatiana, Anna Péczeli and Nickolas Roth. "The Future of US-Russian Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 73, no. 4 (2017): 271–278.

Antonov, Anatolii and Rodion Aiumov. "Kontrol nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope – konets rezhima ili istoriia s prodolzheniem?" *Nauchnye zapiski Pir-tsentra*, no. 1 (2012): 37–45.

Bahr, Egon. "Wandel durch Annäherung." *Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing*. 15 July 1963. https://www.fes.de/archiv/adsd_neu/inhalt/stichwort/tutzinger_rede.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Bergstrand, Bengt-Göran. "Using Military Expenditure Data as a Confidence and Security Building Measure: The UN and OSCE Experience." Paper presented at the Third Nordic Military Symposium, Oslo. 12–13 November 2013.

Billon-Galland, Alice and Martin Quencez. "Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense?" *Policy Brief*. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. 6 October 2017. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/can-france-and-germany-make-pesco-work-process-toward-eu-defense (accessed 19 February 2018).

Britting, Ernst and Hartwig Spitzer. "The Open Skies Treaty." In Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, eds. *Verification Yearbook 2002*: 223–238. London: Vertic, 2002.

Carlsson, Märta and Mike Winnerstig. *Irreconcilable Differences: Analysing the Deteriorating Russian-US relations.* Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016. FOI-R--4276--SE.

Chalmers, Malcolm. "UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit." *RUSI Briefing Paper*. January 2017. https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201701_bp_uk_foreign_and_security_policy_after_brexit_v4.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Dalsjö, Robert. “Baltikum.” In Krister Pallin, ed. *Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av Nordeuropa 2017*: 79–99. Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2018. FOI-R--4563--SE.

Dalsjö, Robert. *Brännpunkt Baltikum*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2016. FOI-R--4278--SE.

Deutsche Welle. “Nato voices skepticism over size of Russia’s military exercise.” 14 September 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/nato-voices-skepticism-over-size-of-russias-zapad-military-exercise/a-39682346 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Dunay, Pál, Márton Krasznai, Hartwig Spitzer, Rafael Wiemker and William Wynne. *Open Skies. A Cooperative Approach to Military Transparency and Confidence Building*. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2004.

Durkalec, Jacek. “Rethinking Conventional Arms Control in Europe: A Transparency-Centred Approach.” *Strategic File No. 7*. September 2013. The Polish Institute of International Affairs. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/169601/PISM%20Strategic%20File%20no%207%20(34).pdf (accessed 19 February 2017).

Eellend, Johan. “Germany – A Long Farewell to Ostpolitik.” In Johan Eellend, Niklas H. Rossbach and Anna Sundberg. *The Russian wake-up call to Europe: French, German and British security priorities*: 56–87. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016. FOI-R--4270--SE.

Estonia. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the OSCE. “Information exchange of the code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security.” April 2017. http://www.osce.org/forum-for-security-cooperation/319436?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

Estonia. Riigikogu. *National Security Concept of Estonia 2010*. https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/estonia---national-security-concept-of-estonia-2010.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Etzold, Tobias and Christian Opitz. “Between Military Non-Alignment and Integration.” *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP Comments* 25. April 2015. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2015C25_etz_opt.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

European Leadership Network. “Making conventional arms control fit for the 21st century.” 8 September 2017. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/making-conventional-arms-control-fit-for-the-21st-century_5080.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

European Union. “EU Statement on reissuing the Vienna Document 2011”. OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, No. 834. Vienna, 9 November 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/fsc_834_eu_on_vd_document.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Ferran, Lee. “How the US Says Russia is Cheating in the ‘Open Skies’.” *Code and Dagger*. 16 August 2017. https://codeanddagger.com/news/2017/8/16/how-the-us-says-russia-is-cheating-in-the-open-skies (accessed 19 February 2018).

Filippov, Alexander. “National Interest and International Law.” *Russia in Global Affairs*, no. 2 (2015). http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/National-Interest-and-International-Law--17548 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Finland. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. *Review on Finland’s Security Cooperation*. 2015.

Finland. Prime Minister’s Office. *Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy*. 9/2016.

France. Présidence de la République. *The French White Paper on defence and national security – 2013*.

France. République Française, *Revue strátegique de defense et de sécurité nationale 2017*.

France. “President Macron’s Initiative for Europe: A sovereign, united, democratic Europe.” 26 September 2017. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/european-union/events/article/president-macron-s-initiative-for-europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-europe (accessed 19 February 2018).

France. “The OSCE is essential for security in Europe.” Briefing in the presence of the Austrian OSCE Presidency – Statement by Mr François Delattre, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Security Council. 22 February 2017. https://onu.delegfrance.org/The-OSCE-is-essential-for-security-in-Europe (accessed 19 February 2018).

Frühling, Stephan and Guillaume Lasconjarias. “NATO, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge.” *Survival* 58, no. 2 (2016): 95–116.

Germany. The Federal Government. *White Paper 2016, On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 2016.

Germany. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Relaunching conventional arms control in Europe.” 25 November 2016. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/abruestung/161125-ruestungskontrolle/285652 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Gotkowska, Justyna. “The German initiative for arms control: time for dialogue with Russia.” OSW, 9 September 2016. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-09-09/german-initiative-arms-control-time-dialogue-russia (accessed 19 February 2018).

Hagström Frisell, Eva. “Tyskland.” In Krister Pallin, ed. *Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av Nordeuropa 2017*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2018: 121–140. FOI-R--4563--SE.

Hedenskog, Jakob, Gudrun Persson and Carolina Vendil Pallin. “Russian Security Policy.” In Persson, Gudrun, ed. *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016: 97–132. FOI-R--4326--SE.

Houck, Caroline. “Allies Are Key, Says Trump’s National Security Strategy.” *Defense One*. 13 December 2017. http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2017/12/allies-are-key-says-trumps-national-security-strategy/144508/?oref=search_mcmaster allies (accessed 19 February 2018).

The Independent. “Poland ‘highly concerned’ after Russia moves nuclear-capable missiles into Kaliningrad.” 8 October 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-highly-concerned-after-russia-moves-nuclear-capable-missiles-into-kaliningrad-a7352151.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

The Independent. “How a tiny pocket of Russian land next to Poland could soon become the most dangerous place in Europe.” 28 October 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/russia-military-base-europe-putin-build-up-tensions-west-uk-kaliningrad-a7384571.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

Judson, Jen. “Funding to deter Russia reaches $6.5B in FY19 defense budget request.” *Defense News*. 12 February 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/12/funding-to-deter-russia-reaches-65b-in-fy19-defense-budget-request/ (accessed 8 March 2018).

Kaljurand, Riina, Karlis Neretnieks, Bo Ljung and Julian Tupay. *Developments in the Security Environment of the Baltic Sea Region up to 2020*. Tallinn: International Centre for Defence Studies, September 2012.

Kantola, Timo. “Possible New Negotiations on Conventional Arms Control – A Finnish View.” In Wolfgang Zellner, ed. *Conventional Arms Control in Europe: New Approaches in Challenging Times*: 29–30. Hamburg: CORE Working Paper 26. September 2015.

Kapanadze, Sergi, Ulrich Kühn, Wolfgang Richter and Wolfgang Zellner. “Status-Neutral Security, Confidence-Building and Arms Control Measures in the Georgian Context.” *CORE Working Paper* 28. Hamburg, January 2017.

Kautz, Hanno. “What is the biggest threat for us? Interview with German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel.” *Bild*. 27 December 2017. https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/bild-international/interview-foreign-minister-sigmar-gabriel-54307246.bild.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

Kropatcheva, Elena. “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis.” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 23, no. 1 (2015): 6–24.

Kropatcheva, Elena. “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for Dialogue or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests.” *European Security* 21, no. 3 (2012): 370–394.

Kühn, Ulrich. “Conventional Arms Control 2.0.” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 26, no. 2 (2013), 189-202.

Lachowski, Zdzislaw. *The Adapted CFE Treaty and the Admission of the Baltic States to NATO*. Stockholm: SIPRI, December 2002.

Lachowski, Zdzislaw. *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Lachowski, Zdzislaw. “The CFE Treaty one year after its suspension: a forlorn treaty?” *SIPRI Policy Brief*. January 2009. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/SIPRIPB0901.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Latvia. Saeima. *The National Defence Concept (2016)*. http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Par_aizsardzibas_nozari/Plani,%20koncepcijas/2016/AIMVAK_260516_EN_2.0.ashx (accessed 19 February 2018).

Latvian Public Broadcasting. “Germany’s Steinmeier: NATO needs Russia dialogue.” 13 September 2016. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/germanys-steinmeier-nato-needs-russia-dialogue.a200602/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

Lehne, Stefan. “Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis. *Carnegie Europe*. September 2015. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_249_Lehne_OSCE.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Lindvall, Fredrik and Mike Winnerstig. *Väpnad solidaritet: USA:s militära närvaro i Europa fram till 2020*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016. FOI-R--4428--SE.

Lithuania. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas. “Seimas approved the National Security Strategy.” Press release. 17 January 2017. http://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=119&p_k=2&p_t=168691 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Lithuania. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Lithuania regrets Russia’s decision which reduces transparency.” 5 May 2014. http://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-regrets-russias-decision-which-reduces-transparency (accessed 19 February 2018).

Lo, Bobo. *Russia and the New World Disorder*. London: Chatham House, 2015.

McCausland, Jeffrey D. “The Future of the CFE Treaty – Why It Still Matters.” *EastWest Institute*, 2009. http://scholar.dickinson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1323&context=faculty_publications (accessed 19 February 2018).

Mizin, Viktor I. “Budushchee kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami v Evrope.” In Aleksei Arbatov and Natalia Bubnova, eds. *Bezopasnost i kontrol nad vooruzheniiami 2015–2016: Mezhdunarodnoe vzaimodeistvie v borbe s globalnymi ugrozami*: 125–140. Moscow: IMEMO RAN; ROSSPEN, 2016.

Mälksoo, Lauri. “Russia’s Constitutional Court Defies the European Court of Human Rights – Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation Judgement of 14 July 2015, No. 21-П/2015.” *European Constitutional Law Review*, no. 12 (2016): 377–395.

NATO. *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*. Paris, 27 May 1997. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).

NATO. *Warsaw Summit Communique*. 9 July 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).

NATO. “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.” Fact sheet. May 2017. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

NATO. Ministerial Communiqué, North Atlantic Council. “The Harmel Report: full reports by the rapporteurs on the future tasks of the Alliance.” Brussels 13–14 December 1967. http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/nato-strategy/Harmel_Report_complete.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Olin, Pentti. “A Finnish perspective of the CFE Treaty.” *Baltic Defence Review*, no. 4 (2000): 67–70.

Oreskes, Benjamin. “Exposed Baltics seek NATO help to combat Russia threat.” *Politico*. 26 February 2016. https://www.politico.eu/article/exposed-baltics-seek-nato-help-to-combat-russia-threat/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. “Document of the Stockholm Conference.” 19 September 1986. http://www.osce.org/fsc/41238?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. *Charter of Paris for a New Europe*. Paris 19-21 November 1990. https://www.osce.org/mc/39516?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. “The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security: An Overview of Major Milestones.” 17 June 2009. http://www.osce.org/secretariat/37592?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. “The Indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic Security.” Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut. 18th Partnership for Peace Research Seminar, Vienna Diplomatic Academy. 4 February 2010. http://www.osce.org/sg/41452?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. *Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures*. 30 November 2011. https://www.osce.org/fsc/86597?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. “Open Skies Review Conference: Conventional Arms Control in Europe in a Changing European Security Environment.” Closing remarks delivered by Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller to the Open Skies Treaty 3rd Review Conference. Vienna, 10 June 2015. https://osce.usmission.gov/closing-statement-by-under-secretary-rose-gottemoeller/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. Panel of Eminent Persons. “Renewing Dialogue on European Security: A Way Forward. Report on outreach events of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project in 2016.” 23 November 2016. http://www.osce.org/networks/291001?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. Security Days. “Revitalising military confidence-building, risk reduction and arms control in Europe.” 29 August 2016. http://www.osce.org/sg/261456?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. “From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the twentieth anniversary of the OSCE framework for arms control.” 9 December 2016. http://www.osce.org/cio/289496?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

OSCE. *Treaty on Open Skies.* 24 March 1992. http://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

Oxenstierna, Susanne. “Russian Military Expenditure.” In Gudrun Persson, ed. *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016*. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016: 133–150. FOI-R--4326--SE.

Persson, Gudrun. “The War of the Future: A Conceptual Framework and Practical Conclusions. Essays on Strategic Thought.” *Russian Studies*, no. 3. NATO Defense College, 2017. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1078 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Perthes, Volker and Oliver Meier. “A Baltic Test for European Arms Control.” *Project Syndicate*. 15 February 2017. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nato-russia-baltic-security-dialogue-by-volker-perthes-and-oliver-meier-2017-02?barrier=accessreg (accessed 19 February 2018).

PIR Center. “Perspektivy kontrolia nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope.” 5 May 2017. http://pircenter.org/news/6914-perspektivy-kontrolya-nad-obychnymi-vooruzheniyami-v-evrope (accessed 19 February 2018).

Poland. *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland 2014*. Warsaw, 2014. https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS_RP.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Poland. Ministry of National Defence. *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*. May 2017.

Poland. Ministry of National Defence. “The Warsaw NATO Summit and Its Implications for the Polish-American Bilateral Relationship.” 22 July 2016. http://en.mon.gov.pl/news/article/latest-news/the-warsaw-nato-summit-and-its-implications-for-the-polish-american-bilateral-relationship-u2016-07-25/.

Rettman, Andrew. “US and Germany say No to Poland on NATO base.” *Euobserver*. 16 April 2016. https://euobserver.com/foreign/133084 (accessed 19 February 2018).

RIA Novosti. “Voennyi ekspert rasskazal, chem RF otvetit na narashchivanie sistemy PRO SShA.” 13 October 2017. https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171013/1506749723.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

RIA Novosti. “Voennyi ekspert rasskazal o sposobe zashchity ot globalnogo udara SShA.” 13 October 2017. https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171013/1506774540.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

Richter, Wolfgang. “Sub-regional arms control for the Baltics: What is desirable? What is feasible?” *Deep Cuts Working Paper, No. 8*. July 2016.

Richter, Wolfgang. “Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of Conventional Arms Control.” *Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 11*. September 2017.

Rossbach, Niklas H. “Storbritannien.” In Krister Pallin, ed. *Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av Nordeuropa 2017*: 141–160. Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2018. FOI-R--4563--SE.

Russian Federation. Ministry of Defence. “Vystuplenie nachalnika Generalnogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii – pervogo zamestitelia oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii generala armii Valeriia Gerasimova na otkrytoi zasedanii Kollegii Minoborony Rossii 7 noiabria 2017 g.”. https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12149743@egNews&_print=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Statement by Mr. Sergei Lavrov. The Challenges of ‘Hard Security’ in the Euro-Atlantic Region. The Role of the OSCE in Establishing a Stable and Effective Security System.” OSCE, PC.DEL/480/09. 23 June 2009. http://www.osce.org/cio/37721?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Statement by Mr. Vladimir Voronkov, Director of the Department of Pan-European Co-Operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, at the Joint Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-Operation and the OSCE Permanent Council.” OSCE, FSC-PC.DEL/28/09. 15 September 2009. http://www.osce.org/fsc/38654 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Zaiavlenie rukovoditelia Delegatsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii na peregovorakh v Vene po voprosam voennoi bezopasnosti i kontrolia nad vooruzheniiami A. Iu. Mazura na plenarnom zasedanii Sovmestnoi konsultativnoi gruppy po Dogovoru ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope.” 10 March 2015. http://www.mid.ru/obycnye-vooruzenia/-/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/1089925 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov’s interview with Interfax.” 11 March 2015. No. 424-11-03-2015. http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/obycnye-vooruzenia/-/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/1090147 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Statement by Anton Mazur, Head of the Russian Delegation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control, at the session of the annual OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation.” Vienna, 29 June 2016. No 1272-05-07-2016. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2344591 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii i pechati MID Rossii v sviazi so statei Ministra inostrannykh del FRG .F.-V. Shtainmaiera, opublikovannoi v gazete ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zietung’ 26 avgusta 2016 goda.” 5 September 2016. http://www.mid.ru/obycnye-vooruzenia/-/asset_publisher/MlJdOT56NKIk/content/id/2422300 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*. 30 November 2016. http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Dogovor ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope (DOVSE). Kontrol’ nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope.” 6 July 2017. http://www.mid.ru/obsie-voprosy-mezdunarodnoj-bezopasnosti-i-kontrola-nad-vooruzeniami/-/asset_publisher/6sN03cZTYZOC/content/id/1137833 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Vystuplenie Zamestitelia Sekretaria Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii O. V. Khramova na mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii OBSE po kiberbezopasnosti, g. Vena, 3 noiabria 2017 goda.” 3 November 2017. http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/rso/osce/-/asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/2938933 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Vystuplenie Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S. V Lavrova na V Moskovskoi konferentsii po mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti, Moskva, 27 aprelia 2016 goda.” 27 April 2016. http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2256120/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_viewMode=print&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_qrIndex=1 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Presidential Administration. Vladimir Putin. “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.” 10 February 2007. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Presidential Administration. “Interviu Dmitriia Medvedeva rossiiskim telekanalam.” 31 August 2008. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1276 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Presidential Administration. *Strategiia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 31 December 2015. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document133/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Presidential Administration. *Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, 25 December 2014. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Presidential Administration. Vladimir Putin. “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.” 19 October 2017. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Russian Federation. Presidential Administration. Vladimir Putin. “Poslanie Prezidenta Federalnomu Sobraniiu.” 1 March 2018. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed 7 March 2018).

Sakwa, Richard. *Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Smith-Spark, Laura and Atika Shubert. “Poland welcomes thousands of US troops in NATO show of force.” *CNN*. 14 January 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/14/europe/poland-us-troops-nato-welcome/index.html (accessed 19 February 2018).

Soini, Timo. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland. “The Sea of Change.” The Security Times. 17 February 2017.https://www.securityconference.de/fileadmin/-MSC_/2017/Sonstiges/ST_Feb2017_double_page.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Steinmeier, Frank-Walter. “More security for everyone in Europe: A call for a re-launch of arms control.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 26 August 2016. http://www.osce.org/cio/261146?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

Sundberg, Anna. “France – Between North and South, and Everywhere.” In Johan Eellend, Niklas H. Rossbach and Anna Sundberg. The Russian wake-up call to Europe: French, German and British security priorities: 17–54. Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2016. FOI-R--4270--SE.

Sundberg, Anna. “Polen.” In Krister Pallin, ed. *Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av Nordeuropa 2017*: 101–120. Swedish Defence Research Agency, January 2018. FOI-R--4563--SE.

Sweden. Regeringskansliet. *Nationell säkerhetsstrategi*. January 2017. http://www.regeringen.se/48e36d/contentassets/a02552ad9de94efcb84154b0f6ed76f9/nationell-sakerhetsstrategi.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

The Telegraph. “British troops arrive in Estonia to deter Russian aggression in one of the biggest deployments to the region in decades.” 18 March 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/18/british-troops-arrive-estonia-deter-russian-aggression-one-biggest/ (accessed 19 February 2818).

Trenin, Dmitri. “Avoiding U.S.-Russia Military Escalation During the Hybrid War.” *U.S.-Russia Insight*: 5–7. Moscow: Carnegie, January 2018. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Trenin_Hybrid_War_web.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia’s Spheres of Interests, not Influence.” *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2009): 3–22.

Turner, Bruce I. “Revitalizing Military Confidence-Building, Risk Reduction, and Arms Control in Europe, Remarks at the OSCE Security Days: Roundtable on Re-launching Conventional Arms Control in the OSCE Context.” Vienna. 3 October 2016.

United Kingdom. *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*. November 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478936/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_PRINT_only.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States, Department of State. “2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.” 14 April 2017. https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270330.htm (accessed 26 September 2017).

United States. Department of State. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. “The U.S. and Europe: Strengthening Western Alliances.” Remarks at the Wilson Center, Washington, DC. 28 November 2017. https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/11/276002.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. Department of State. *Compliance With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Condition (5) (C) Report*. January 2017. https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2017/270369.htm (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. Department of Defense. "European Reassurance Initiative, Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2018." May 2017. http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2018_ERI_J-Book.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. U.S. Army. John Strickland. "U.S. Army-led NATO Battle Group on deterrence mission in Poland." 25 September 2017. https://www.army.mil/article/193970/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. U.S. Army. "Enhanced Forward Presence." 25 September 2017. https://www.army.mil/standto/2017-09-25 (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. U.S. EUCOM. *European Reassurance Initiative*. Fact Sheet. 5 January 2017.

United States. U.S. Army Europe. "What is Atlantic Resolve?" The Official Homepage of the United States Army Europe. http://www.eur.army.mil/AtlanticResolve/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. U.S. Mission to the OSCE. "Developments of the Structured Dialogue. Remarks by Chargé d'Affaires, a.i. Kate M. Byrnes to the Joint Meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council." Vienna, 5 July 2017. https://osce.usmission.gov/structured_dialogue_development/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. U.S. Mission to the OSCE. "Open Skies Review Conference: Conventional Arms Control in Europe in a Changing European Security Environment." Closing remarks delivered by Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller to the Open Skies Treaty 3rd Review Conference. Vienna, 10 June 2015. https://osce.usmission.gov/closing-statement-by-under-secretary-rose-gottemoeller/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. U.S. Mission to the OSCE. "Reissuing the Vienna Document 2011." 17 November 2016. http://www.osce.org/fsc/282846?download=true (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. U.S. Mission to the OSCE. "U.S. Statement at Reinforced Meeting of the IWG on Structured Dialogue. As delivered by Jorgan Andrews, Office of Eastern European Affairs." 5 September 2017. https://osce.usmission.gov/u-s-statement-reinforced-meeting-of-the-informal-working-group-on-structured-dialogue/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

United States. U.S. Mission to the OSCE. “U.S. Remarks for 3rd IWG Structured Dialogue meeting. Session II: ‘Arms control arrangements under the aegis of the OSCE: Is there a better way to handle compliance?’” As delivered by Chargé d’ Affaires, A.I. Harry Kamian. 5 September 2017. https://osce.usmission.gov/u-s-remarks-3rd-iwg-structured-dialogue-meeting/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

Westerlund, Fredrik. “Russia’s Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad.” *RUFS Briefing, no. 40*, FOI Memo 6060, May 2017, https://www.foi.se/download/18.bc6b81b15be852194d71d/1494413062692/RUFS%20Briefing%20No%2040%20Kaliningrad%20by%20Fredrik%20Westerlund.pdf (accessed 19 February 2018)

Westerlund, Fredrik and Johan Norberg. “The Fighting Power of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2016.” In Gudrun Persson, ed. *Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016*: 67–96. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2016. FOI-R--4326--SE.

Williams, Ian. “The Russia-NATO A2AD Environment.” Missile Threat, *CSIS Missile Defense Project*. 3 January 2017. https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-nato-a2ad-environment/ (accessed 19 February 2018).

Winnerstig, Mike. “USA.” In Krister Pallin, ed. *Västlig militär förmåga. En analys av Nordeuropa 2017*: 161–179. Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2018. FOI-R--4563--SE.

YLE. “Putin agrees to Finnish proposal on aircraft transponders.” 1 July 2016. https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/putin_agrees_to_finnish_proposal_on_aircraft_transponders/8999141 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Zellner, Wolfgang, ed. *Conventional Arms Control in Europe: New Approaches in Challenging Times*. Hamburg: CORE Working Paper *26*. September 2015.

Zulkharneev, Albert and Evgenii Buzhinskii. “Kontrol nad obychnymi vooruzheniiami v Evrope ne dolzhen uviazyvatsia s politicheskimi voprosami.” *Nasha Gazeta*. 17 March 2014. http://nashagazeta.ch/print/17336 (accessed 19 February 2018).

Undertaken at a time when European security is under stress, this study analyses the preconditions for a new conventional arms control regime. To this end, the military-political interests of Russia, the US and selected European countries are examined with regard to three principal questions: What are the major security policy goals for Russia, the US and European states? Which are the prevailing military-political considerations in these countries' pursuit of those goals? And how do the interests and policies of the respective states dovetail with a renewed focus on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures?

There is an underlying tension between the diplomatic interest of dialogue and negotiation on the one hand and the hard military security interests of states on the other hand. At present, the prospects for negotiations on a new conventional arms control regime are slim. No changes are to be expected as long as the two major players – Russia and the US – remain on the fringes of the dialogue.

FOI

ISSN1650-1942

www.foi.se